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TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL 
PACE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
MOOT COURT COMPETITION 
2010 Judges’ Edition Memorandum 
 
Alokananda Dutta* 
 
Statement of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Union. 
On January 5, 2009, Citizen Advocates for Regulation and 
the Environment, Inc.  (CARE), served a petition on the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
under §7004 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992, 6974 (2006) and § 553(e) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006).  
The petition requested that EPA commence proceedings to 
withdraw its approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste 
regulatory program to operate in lieu of the federal program 
under RCRA, pursuant to RCRA § 3006(b).  42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) 
(2006).  (R. at 4)1.  In support of its petition to EPA, CARE recited 
a litany of facts that arose after EPA‘s initial approval and 
alleged that New Union‘s program no longer met the criteria for 
EPA approval.  EPA took no action on that petition.  (R. at 4). 
On January 4, 2010 CARE filed a suit in the District Court 
against EPA, first seeking an injunction requiring EPA to act on 
that petition or, in the alternative, judicial review of EPA‘s 
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2010 Pace Law School, and assisted by Emily B. Marotta, J.D. Candidate, 2011 
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 1. ―R‖ refers to the Record in this case. 
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constructive denial of the petition premised on its constructive 
determination that New Union‘s hazardous waste program 
continued to meet the criteria for approval despite the alleged 
deficiencies.  (R. at 4).  The State of New Union filed an 
unopposed motion to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, which 
the court granted.  (R. at 4).  The facts alleged by CARE were 
uncontested and the parties also agreed that no further facts 
were necessary to make a decision.  (R. at 4).  Thereafter, the 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  (R. at 4). 
CARE, unsure of its jurisdictional basis, simultaneously filed 
a petition for review with this Court, C.A. No. 18-2010, seeking 
judicial review of EPA‘s constructive denial and determination on 
the same grounds.  (R. at 4, 5).  New Union also moved to 
intervene in that case, which this Court granted.  (R. at 5).  EPA 
filed a motion to stay the proceeding in this Court pending the 
outcome of the case in the District Court.  (R. at 5). 
The District Court dismissed CARE‘s action, holding that it 
lacked jurisdiction under both RCRA § 7002(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 to order EPA to act on a petition submitted pursuant to 
RCRA § 7004 and APA § 553(e).  (R. at 7, 8).  In dismissing 
CARE‘s citizen suit, the District Court determined that EPA 
approval or disapproval of New Union‘s program was an order 
and not a rulemaking.  As such, the District Court held that 
EPA‘s action was not subject to petition under RCRA § 7004, 
which authorizes petitions only for promulgation, amendment, or 
repeal of rules.  (R. at 7).  The district court also held that it 
lacked jurisdiction under § 1331 because APA § 553(e) authorizes 
petitions only for promulgation, amendment, or repeal of rules.  
(R. at 8).  With regards to CARE‘s claim for judicial review of 
EPA‘s constructive actions under RCRA § 3006, the District Court 
held that jurisdiction for review lies in the Court of Appeals, but 
that judicial review was time-barred.  (R. at 8). 
Statement of the Statutory Context 
This case revolves around RCRA.  RCRA creates a cradle-to-
grave regulatory scheme for the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste.  Of 
particular relevance to the present action is that RCRA favors 
administration of its hazardous waste regulatory program by 
states with approved programs, RCRA §1003(a)(7).  In this 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
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regard, § 3006(b) authorizes the EPA to approve a state program 
to operate in lieu of the federal program where the EPA 
determines that the state program is equivalent to the federal 
program, is consistent with the federal and state programs of 
other approved states, and the state has adequate resources to 
provide adequate enforcement.  42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006).  
Against this backdrop of federal-state cooperation, RCRA also 
favors citizen participation by giving citizens enforcement 
authority by either bringing alleged violations to the attention of 
EPA or by directly bringing enforcement actions against any 
persons, including the United States, the EPA, and other 
governmental instrumentality or agency, alleged to be in 
violation of the federal standards.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6974, 6972 
(2006).  Specific to this case is § 7004(a), which allows citizens to 
petition EPA for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any 
rules.  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  Second, is § 7002(a)(2), which 
gives citizens the authority to bring a civil action against the 
Administrator for alleged failure to perform a nondiscretionary 
duty.  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2006). 
Statement of the Facts 
In 1986, EPA approved New Union‘s hazardous waste 
program under the statutory authority of § 3006(b) based on its 
finding that New Union‘s Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) had the resources and capabilities to fully 
administer the state program, including the issuance of permits 
in a timely manner, inspection of all RCRA regulated facilities at 
least every other year, taking enforcement actions against all 
significant violations, and administering all other necessary parts 
of the program.  (Rec. doc. 2, p.1).  The EPA noted, however, that 
with fewer resources the program might not be adequate.  (Rec. 
doc. 4, p. 16). 
Since the initial approval, New Union‘s resources devoted to 
its state program have decreased considerably, while demands 
have increased.  (R. at 10).  In 1986, there were 1,200 hazardous 
waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities (TSDs) in the 
state requiring permits under RCRA and 50 full-time employees.  
(Rec. doc. 1, p.17, 73).  However, in its 2009 Annual Report to 
EPA, the DEP reported 1,500 TSDs but only 30 full-time 
employees (a decrease of 40%).  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p. 23, 52).  
3
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This attrition in resources occurred mostly after the year 2000 
when the state‘s finances started to deteriorate. 
DEP‘s shortage of resources has translated directly into a 
deterioration of its ability to implement and enforce its state 
RCRA program.  In its 2009 Annual Report to EPA, the DEP 
indicated that it had a growing backlog of permit applications; 
some 900 TSDs had expired permits but were continued by 
operation of law (some of them expired as long as 20 years ago), 
and at the same time it had about 50 applications a year from 
new facilities or permitted facilities seeking amended permits to 
expand their operations.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p. 20).  The 2009 
Annual Report also indicated that the DEP could not inspect 
more than 10% of the TSDs a year, rather than the 50% 
minimum required by RCRA.  Even with EPA‘s inspection of a 
comparable number of facilities last year and again in the present 
year, RCRA‘s mandate of inspecting these facilities will not be 
met. 
In 2000, the New Union legislature enacted the 2000 
Environmental Regulatory Adjustment Act (ERAA), which 
contained a number of amendments to environmental legislation.  
Two of these amendments are pertinent in this case.  The first 
was an amendment to the Railroad Regulation Act (RRA).  The 
ERAA amended the RRA by transferring ―all standard setting, 
permitting, inspection, and enforcement authorities of the DEP 
under any and all state environmental statutes to the 
Commission.‖  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 103-05).  It also removed 
criminal sanctions for violations of environmental statutes by 
facilities falling under the jurisdiction of the Commission.  Id.  
The second pertinent provision was an amendment to the state 
hazardous waste program with regard to the treatment of 
Pollutant X, which requires: (1) a phase out of the generation of 
Pollutant X in New Union; (2) a cease in issuance of permits 
allowing the treatment, storage or disposal of Pollutant X; and (3) 
transport of Pollutant X through New Union to be quick, with no 
stops within New Union except for emergencies and refueling.  
(Rec. doc 5 for 2000, pp. 105-07). 
Following the issuance of the District Court‘s order, CARE 
and EPA each filed a Notice of Appeal.  The parties were directed 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
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to brief seven issues2.  This bench brief discusses each of the 
issues in turn.  For each issue, the position of the parties and the 
law are discussed. 
ISSUE I 
Does § 7002(a)(2) provide jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE’s petition for 
revocation of EPA’s approval of New Union’s hazardous 
waste program, filed pursuant to RCRA § 7004? 
 
Relevant Statutory Provisions 
§ 7002(a)(2), RCRA‘s citizen suit provision: ―Except as 
provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf against the 
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the 
Administrator to perform any act or duty under [RCRA] which is 
not discretionary with the Administrator.‖ 
§ 7004(a), Petition for Rulemaking provision: ―Any person 
may petition the Administrator for the promulgation, 
amendment, or repeal of any regulation under [RCRA].  Within a 
reasonable time following receipt of such petition, the 
Administrator shall take action with respect to such petition and 
shall publish notice of such action in the Federal Register, 
together with the reasons therefore.‖ 
Position of the Parties 
CARE and EPA argue that RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides 
jurisdiction to order EPA to respond to CARE‘s petition filed 
pursuant to RCRA § 7004.  CARE argues § 7004 also provides 
jurisdiction to order EPA to commence proceedings to consider 
withdrawing approval of New Union‘s program under § 3006(b), 
while EPA argues it does not. 
New Union argues that RCRA § 7002(a)(2) does not provide 
jurisdiction to order EPA to act on a petition filed pursuant to 
RCRA § 7004. 
 
 2. See Record for a list of issues. 
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Discussion 
Determining whether RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides 
jurisdiction for district courts to order EPA to act on CARE‘s 
petition for revocation of EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s 
hazardous waste program, filed pursuant to RCRA § 7004, 
requires an analysis of two threshold questions: (1) whether 
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program was a 
rule or an order; and (2) whether § 7004 imposes mandatory or 
discretionary duties on EPA to act on petitions.  The District 
Court will have subject matter jurisdiction if EPA‘s approval of 
New Union‘s program was a rule, and if § 7004(a) of RCRA sets 
forth duties which are not discretionary with the Administrator. 
A. Was EPA’s approval of New Union’s hazardous 
waste program a rule making or an order? 
The first issue is whether EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s 
hazardous waste program was a rule or an order.  The rule/order 
distinction is crucial because CARE‘s petition to the EPA was 
filed pursuant to RCRA § 7004.  Section 7004 of RCRA authorizes 
any person to petition EPA for the promulgation, amendment, or 
repeal of regulations.  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, CARE‘s petition will stand only if EPA‘s approval 
of New Union‘s hazardous waste program is a rulemaking.  If 
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s program was not a rule, but was 
rather an order, then this Court should hold that CARE‘s action 
was properly dismissed by the District Court for failure to state a 
claim. 
The analysis of this issue turns on the parties‘ 
interpretations of what administrative actions constitute rules 
and what administrative actions constitute orders.  Courts have 
consistently reviewed an agency‘s interpretation of a statute it is 
charged with administering (EPA and RCRA) following the two-
step analysis set forth in Chevron.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron 
defines a reviewing court‘s role in reviewing an agency‘s 
interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering.  
Chevron sets forth a two-pronged analysis.  Under step one, if 
Congress has clearly spoken on a issue, then the agency and the 
court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
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Congress.  Id. at 842-44.  If the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to a particular issue, then the courts proceed to the 
second step in the analysis, and if the agency‘s interpretation is a 
permissible construction of the statute, then the courts must give 
deference to the agency.  Id.  However, courts are split on 
whether Chevron analysis applies to an agency‘s interpretation of 
a statute it is not charged with administering (EPA and APA). 
Conclusion: For the reasons set forth below, CARE and EPA‘s 
argument that the approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste 
program was a rulemaking is equally as persuasive as New 
Union‘s argument that the approval was an order. 
CARE and EPA’s argument 
CARE and EPA will argue that the District Court erred in 
dismissing CARE‘s petition for failure to state a claim because 
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program was a 
rulemaking. 
a. EPA’s approval of New Union’s program is a “rule” as 
set forth in the APA. 
―Rule‖3 is defined in the APA as ―the whole or part of an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future 
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy 
or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency. . .‖  5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).  ―Order‖ 
is defined as the ―whole or a part of a final disposition, whether 
affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an 
agency in a matter other than rule making but including 
licensing.‖  Id. §551(6). 
―Two principal characteristics distinguish rulemaking from 
adjudication.  First, adjudications resolve disputes among specific 
individuals in specific cases, whereas rulemaking affects the 
rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals. . .Second, 
because adjudications involve concrete disputes, they have an 
immediate effect on specific individuals (those involved in the 
dispute).  Rulemaking, in contrast, is prospective, and has a 
definitive effect on individuals only after the rule subsequently is 
 
 3. Regulation and rule are used interchangeably. 
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applied.‖  Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 
448 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 216-17 (1988) (explaining that the ―central 
distinction‖ between rulemaking and adjudication is that rules 
have legal consequences ―only for the future‖) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added); Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 
U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (stating that a ―judicial inquiry investigates, 
declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past 
facts and under laws supposed already to exist.  That is the 
purpose and end.  Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the 
future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to 
be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its 
power.‖) 
CARE and EPA will argue that EPA‘s approval of New 
Union‘s program fits within the distinctions set forth in Yesler.  
First, even though EPA focused specifically on New Union‘s state 
program, its approval affected the rights of broad classes of 
unspecified individuals, such as generators, transporters, and 
disposers of waste in New Union.  Second, the approval did not 
immediately affect specific individuals.  Rather, the approval 
changed existing conditions in that it transferred authority from 
the federal government to the State of New Union, to be applied 
henceforth, i.e. the future. 
In addition, CARE and EPA will argue that the District 
Court failed to take into account that the APA definition of ―rule‖ 
explicitly includes the phrase ―of particular applicability‖.  5 
U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).  CARE and EPA will argue that, therefore, 
the fact that EPA specifically considered New Union‘s (a 
particular party) state program does not warrant the conclusion 
that EPA‘s action was an order. 
b. EPA’s interpretation that § 3006(b) of RCRA requires 
approval of state programs through rulemaking is a 
permissible interpretation. 
CARE and EPA will argue that EPA‘s determination that its 
approval of New Union‘s program was a rulemaking is entitled to 
Chevron deference because EPA was interpreting a provision of 
RCRA, a statute that it administers, while only applying the 
procedures set forth in the APA for rulemaking.  CARE and EPA 
will argue that since Congress did not unambiguously state 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
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whether EPA should proceed under rulemaking or adjudication in 
approving a state implementation program under § 3006(b) of 
RCRA, EPA‘s interpretation of the provision should be given 
deference, so long as it is a permissible construction of the 
statute.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stating that ―if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency‘s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.‖). 
The procedure set forth in RCRA § 3006(b) supports the 
assertion that EPA‘s initial approval of New Union‘s program was 
a rulemaking.  CARE and EPA will argue that the steps explicitly 
outlined in § 3006(b) of RCRA–notice, opportunity for public 
hearing, and publishing of findings—are similar to the process 
outlined in the APA for the promulgation of rules.  Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 6926(b) with 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  As further support, 
CARE and EPA will cite to cases where courts validated EPA‘s 
use of rulemaking in approving state programs.  See United 
States v. S. Union Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 201, 211-14 (D. R.I. 2009) 
(validating EPA‘s use of rulemaking under RCRA); Maryland v. 
EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1975) (validating EPA‘s use of 
rulemaking under CAA). 
CARE and EPA will argue that, additionally, policy 
considerations support EPA‘s determination that New Union‘s 
approval process was a rulemaking.  Notice-and-comment 
rulemaking allows the general public to participate in the 
deliberative process.  See David L. Shapiro, The Choice of 
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 930 (1965).  This is especially 
important in the current context because, upon approval, 
authority is transferred from the federal government to the state 
to administer and enforce all matters pertaining to the 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of 
hazardous waste and, as such, the policies and regulations 
incorporated in the state program have far reaching and 
widespread effects on its citizens.  CARE and EPA will argue that 
as a matter of policy, the APA never intends for such an 
important process to be decided by an order.  Further, that it is 
both rational and logical to conclude that in an approval process 
9
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carrying such great import, Congress surely intended that the 
public be given the opportunity to partake in the matter. 
c. Even if the District Court was correct in holding that 
EPA interpreted the APA and not RCRA with 
regards to § 3006(b), the District Court was 
nonetheless required to defer to EPA’s 
determination. 
CARE and EPA will argue that even if EPA was not entitled 
to Chevron deference, the District Court should have held that 
EPA‘s characterization of its action was correct.  CARE and EPA 
will rely on United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 
(2001), where the Supreme Court held that ―in instances where 
the agency is interpreting a statute it does not administer 
Chevron deference will not be given, but nonetheless courts are to 
respect the agency‘s interpretation as is warranted by the degree 
of the agency‘s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency‘s position.‖  
As further support for this argument, CARE and EPA will rely on 
circuit court cases that accord significant deference to an agency‘s 
characterization of its own action, even in instances where the 
agency interprets a statute it is not charged with administering.  
See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (―In determining whether an agency action constituted 
adjudication or rulemaking, we look to the product of the agency 
action.  We also accord significant deference to an agency‘s 
characterization of its own action.‖).  See also British Caledonian 
Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 584 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
New Union’s argument 
a. CARE’s petition, filed pursuant to § 7004(a), is 
improper because CARE is petitioning for the 
withdrawal of state approval, which is clearly an 
agency order. 
New Union will argue that EPA‘s initial approval of New 
Union‘s state hazardous waste program is not at issue in the 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
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present action.  Rather, the issue here concerns the withdrawal of 
authorization of a state program under § 3006(e) of RCRA.  42 
U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006).  The withdrawal provision provides: 
Whenever the Administrator determines after public hearing 
that a State is not administering and enforcing a program 
authorized under this section and in accordance with the 
requirements of this section, he shall so notify the State and, if 
appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable 
time, not to exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall 
withdraw authorization of such program. . . 
Id. 
New Union will argue that the withdrawal provision requires 
the Administrator to make a determination by relying on past 
and present facts existing at the time of such determination with 
respect to a specific state.  Citing to the APA‘s definitions of ―rule‖ 
versus ―order,‖4 New Union will argue that the procedure set 
forth in § 3006(e) clearly indicates that withdrawal of a state‘s 
program constitutes an order. 
In further support of its argument, New Union will cite two 
Supreme Court cases which provide courts with helpful 
distinctions between ―orders‖ and ―rules‖.  ―The Londoner/Bi-
Metallic teaching. . .is that ‗orders‘ are usually adjudicative in 
nature and apply to a particular group, whereas ‗rules‘ are more 
legislative in nature and have general applicability.‖  N. Am. 
Aviation Prop., Inc. v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 94 F.3d 1029, 
1031 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 
373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 239 
U.S. 441 (1915); Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 
442, 448 (9th Cir. 1994).  Relying on the distinction set forth 
above, New Union will assert that the process involved in 
determining whether to withdraw authorization is clearly 
adjudicative in nature because making this determination 
requires EPA to apply specific facts concerning New Union‘s 
 
 4. As stated earlier, ―rule‖ is defined in the APA as ―the whole or part of an 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect 
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the 
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency…‖  5 U.S.C. § 
551(4) (2006).  An ―order‖ is defined as the ―whole or a part of a final disposition, 
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in 
a matter other than rule making but including licensing.‖  Id. § 551(6). 
11
03 JUDGES_MEMO 4/24/2011  2:25 AM 
2011] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 31 
program.  Once the determination is made, that is the purpose 
and the end.  There is nothing left to be prospectively applied at a 
future time. 
New Union will thus argue that CARE improperly submitted 
a petition under § 7004(a) of RCRA because § 7004(a) allows a 
person to petition the EPA only for the promulgation, 
amendment, or repeal of a regulation.  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  
Additionally, in order to challenge a particular agency action 
under RCRA, that action has to be enumerated in the statutory 
provision that is used to challenge the action.  Since § 7004(a) 
does not provide for a petition challenging an order, the lower 
court properly dismissed CARE‘s action for failure to state a 
claim.  See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. U.S. EPA, 493 F.3d 
207, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (dismissing for failure to state a 
claim because policy statements are not enumerated in § 7006(a)); 
Am. Portland Cement Alliance v. U.S. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 774 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing the case for failure to state a claim 
because regulatory determinations are not enumerated in 
§7006(a)). 
b. The District Court correctly held that EPA is not 
entitled to Chevron deference. 
New Union will argue that EPA‘s determination that its 
approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste program was a 
rulemaking is not entitled to Chevron deference because EPA‘s 
construction of the § 3006(b) approval process required EPA to 
interpret the definitions of ―rule‖ and ―order‖ under the APA.  
Therefore, EPA was interpreting the APA and not RCRA.  New 
Union will argue that the Chevron analysis only applies to 
situations where a court is reviewing an agency‘s interpretation 
of a statute the agency is authorized to administer.  In support of 
this argument, New Union will rely on the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).  
There the Supreme Court limited Chevron deference to situations 
in which Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and where the subject 
agency interpretation was in the exercise of that authority.  Id. at 
226-27.  New Union will argue that, applying the principle set 
forth in Mead to the case at bar, since EPA was interpreting the 
APA, EPA‘s interpretation is not subject to Chevron deference.  In 
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further support of its assertion, New Union will rely on American 
Forest and Paper Ass’n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1998), 
where the circuit court held: ―[w]e do not, however, accord 
Chevron deference to EPA‘s interpretation of the ESA, because 
the ESA is not a statute that EPA is charged with administering.‖ 
B. Does § 7004 impose mandatory duties on EPA to 
act on petitions? 
Section 7002(a)(2) of RCRA authorizes any person to 
commence a civil action against the Administrator ―where there 
is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or 
duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the 
Administrator.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).  
Assuming arguendo that EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s program 
was a rule, this Court must still decide whether § 7004 of RCRA 
imposes a mandatory duty on EPA to act on petitions because the 
precondition to suits brought pursuant to § 7002(a)(2) is a failure 
of the Administrator to perform an act or duty that is not 
discretionary.  The issue here is whether ―shall‖ indicates a 
mandatory or discretionary duty on the Administrator.  If the 
duties imposed by § 7004(a) are mandatory, i.e., not 
discretionary, then the District Court would have subject matter 
jurisdiction.  If, however, this Court finds that the duties are 
discretionary, then this Court should find that the District Court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear CARE‘s case, since it was 
brought pursuant to § 7002(a)(2). 
CARE’s argument 
a. The plain language of § 7004(a) supports a finding 
that it imposes nondiscretionary duties on the EPA. 
CARE will argue that a §7004(a) petition requesting that 
EPA repeal its authorization of a state program, imposes a clear-
cut mandatory duty on EPA to respond to the petition, and 
therefore the District Court has jurisdiction under § 7002(a)(2) of 
RCRA.  First, CARE will point to the plain language of § 7004(a), 
which provides in pertinent part that ―[w]ithin a reasonable time 
following receipt of such petition, the Administrator shall take 
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action with respect to such petition. . .‖  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) 
(2006) (emphasis added).  CARE will argue that the use of ―shall‖ 
indicates Congress‘ intent to impose a non discretionary duty on 
the Administrator to take action with respect to the petition.  See 
Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) (holding that 
statutory language that an act ―shall‖ be carried out is generally 
regarded as mandatory); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935) 
(holding that the word ‗shall‘ is ordinarily a language of 
command); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(―Use of the word ‗shall‘ generally indicates a mandatory intent 
unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made.‖). 
CARE will cite to National Wildlife Federation v. Adamkus, 
936 F. Supp. 435, 442 (W.D. Mich. 1996).  There, petitioners 
submitted comments pursuant to the CWA regarding changes to 
Michigan‘s wetlands program pursuant to an EPA request for 
public comments.  Id.  The court there relied on 40 C.F.R. § 
233.43 (2010), which stated that the Administrator ―shall respond 
in writing to any petition to commence withdrawal proceedings,‖ 
to conclude that EPA had a non-discretionary duty to respond to 
petitions.  CARE will argue that similar to National Wildlife, 
EPA had a nondiscretionary duty to respond in writing to CARE‘s 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings. 
Additionally, CARE will point to 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (2010), 
which sets forth the procedures for withdrawing approval of State 
programs under § 3006(e) of RCRA, and states in pertinent part 
that the ―Administrator shall respond in writing to any petition 
to commence withdrawal proceedings. . .‖  Id. (emphasis added).  
It goes on to state that the Administer may conduct an informal 
investigation of the allegations in the petition to determine 
whether cause exists to commence proceedings.  Id.  CARE will 
argue that the last two sentences, read together, clearly indicate 
EPA‘s acknowledgement that § 3006(e) imposes a mandatory 
duty on the Administrator to respond in writing to such petitions, 
regardless of whether the Administrator determines that a cause 
exists to commence proceedings.  See United States ex rel. Siegel 
v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 360 (1895) (holding that when the same 
rule uses both ‗may‘ and ‗shall‘, the normal inference is that each 
is used in its usual sense-the one act being permissive, the other 
mandatory); Koch Ref. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 497 F. Supp. 
879 (D. Minn. 1978). 
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b. If the Court holds that § 7004 imposes merely 
discretionary duties, it would vitiate the statutory 
scheme for public participation in the 
implementation of RCRA. 
CARE will argue that overriding policy considerations 
support the assertion that § 7004 imposes nondiscretionary 
duties on EPA to act on a petition.  CARE will stress that 
petitions are a crucial mechanism through which an interested 
person can bring alleged defects in the implementation of RCRA 
to the attention of the agency.  Allowing EPA to ignore 
information presented to it through citizen petitions would defeat 
the public participation policy of RCRA.  Even if an express 
finding of a violation is required to activate the Administrator‘s 
duty to initiate proceedings, this does not mean that the 
Administrator‘s duty to act on a petition to make such a 
determination is discretionary.  CARE will argue that to hold 
otherwise would abrogate the public participation scheme of 
RCRA.  In support of this argument CARE might rely on 
Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power & 
Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Wis. 1975); see also S. Carolina 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 130 (D. S.C 1978). 
CARE will then argue that Congress included the § 7004(a) 
citizen petition authority in RCRA to encourage persons to bring 
violations to the attention of EPA, thereby providing an effective 
mechanism for the protection and welfare of the public.  Since 
citizen petition authority was designed for this purpose, the use 
of ―shall‖ should be construed as mandatory.  See Escoe v. Zerbst, 
295 U.S. 490, 494 (1935); In re National Mills, 133 F.2d 604, 607 
(7th Cir. 1943) (holding that a ―provision in a statute designed for 
the protection of the public or third parties is usually considered 
as mandatory). 
EPA’s argument 
EPA will argue that its only nondiscretionary duty with 
regards to a petition filed under § 7004(a) is to respond to it in 
writing. 
a. EPA’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference 
because Congress did not define what actions EPA is 
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required to undertake. 
EPA will argue that although Congress requires EPA to take 
action, it did not specify what actions EPA must take with 
regards to petitions for repeal of a rule.  Since Congress has not 
directly spoken on the matter, EPA will argue once again that its 
interpretation of § 7004(a) is entitled to Chevron deference.  
Section 7004(a) allows any person to petition the Administrator 
for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regulation and 
states that EPA ―shall take action with respect to such petition 
and shall publish notice of such petition in the Federal Register, 
together with the reasons therefor.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  
EPA will cite to cases that hold that ‗shall‘ indicates a non-
discretionary duty.  See Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 
(1947); Zerbst, 295 U.S. at 493, Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F. 2d at 
489 (1977).  EPA will also cite to 40 C.F.R. § 271.23, which sets 
forth the procedures for withdrawing approval of State programs 
under § 3006(e) of RCRA.  The regulation states, in pertinent 
part, that the ―Administrator shall respond in writing to any 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings. . .‖  40 C.F.R. § 
271.23 (2010) (emphasis added).  EPA will argue that the only 
mandatory duty that EPA failed to take was that which it 
mandated for itself in the regulation—to respond in writing to 
petitions for withdrawal of state programs. 
b. A mandatory duty to initiate enforcement 
proceedings in response to every § 7004 petition for 
withdrawal of a state program would hamper EPA’s 
ability to efficiently carry out the statutory goals of 
RCRA. 
First, EPA will argue that its decision not to commence 
withdrawal proceedings constituted an agency action, and was 
therefore an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.  EPA will rely 
on Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985), which stands for 
the proposition that an ―agency‘s decision not to take enforcement 
action should be presumed immune from judicial review. . 
.[because] such a decision has traditionally been ‗committed to 
agency discretion‘. . .‖  See also Harmon Cove Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v 
Marsh, 815 F.2d 949, 952-53 (3rd Cir. 1987).  The Court in 
Chaney noted that an agency‘s exercise of its prosecutorial 
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discretion involves a balancing of several factors, including 
whether its resources are best spent on the particular violation or 
another and the allocation of resources, and that such 
considerations are peculiarly within the discretion of the agency.  
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.  See also Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 782 
F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1986); Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 
1375 (5th Cir. 1981).  EPA will assert that its authority to take 
actions on allegations set forth in a citizen petition comprises just 
one of the many enforcement options provided under RCRA, and 
a decision not to take action on the petition constituted an 
enforcement action.  In this regard, EPA will assert that a duty to 
take enforcement action is wholly discretionary.  See Thompson v. 
Thomas, 680 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. D.C. 1987).  Further, EPA will 
argue that, in deciding not to act on the petition, it exercised its 
discretion to decide how best to spend its limited resources so as 
to effectively and efficiently carry out the requirements set forth 
in RCRA‘s statutory scheme. 
EPA will argue that the statutory language of § 7004 does 
not support a finding that EPA had a non-discretionary duty to 
commence proceedings to withdraw authorization of New Union‘s 
program.  In support of its argument, EPA will rely on United 
States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 
(1940), where the Supreme Court stated that in interpretation of 
statutes, the function of the courts is to ―construe the language so 
as to give effect to the intent of Congress. . .To take a few words 
from their context and with them thus isolated to attempt to 
determine their meaning, certainly would not contribute greatly 
to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute. . .‖  
EPA will argue that the plain language of §7004(a), taken in 
isolation, does not accurately portray the intent of Congress, and 
that should this Court hold the plain language of § 7004(a) to be 
determinative, this Court will in actuality frustrate the intent of 
Congress. 
In further support of this argument, EPA will point out that 
in American Trucking, the Supreme Court also held that ―even 
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results, but 
merely an unreasonable one ‗plainly at variance‘ with the policy 
of the legislation as a whole this Court followed that purpose, 
rather than the literal words.‖  American Trucking, 310 U.S. at 
543.  See also Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922); 
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Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F. 2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977).  EPA will 
argue that holding that § 7004 imposes a mandatory duty to 
commence enforcement proceedings in response to petitions 
would compel EPA to expend its limited resources in 
investigating multitudinous citizen petitions irrespective of their 
environmental significance, which would invariably hamper 
EPA‘s ability to efficiently and effectively monitor or prosecute 
those complaints the EPA considers to be of significance. 
Furthermore, EPA will argue that a ―readily ascertainable 
deadline‖ for agency action is necessary to argue that § 7004(a) in 
the context of § 3006(e) imposed a mandatory duty on EPA to 
commence withdrawal hearings.  See Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 
F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (―In order to impose a clear-cut 
nondiscretionary duty, we believe that a duty of timeliness must 
―categorically mandate‖ that all specified action be taken by a 
date-certain deadline.‖); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 
630 F.2d 754, 766 (10th Cir.1980) (citizen suit jurisdiction proper 
only in action to enforce ―specific nondiscretionary clear-cut 
requirements of the Clean Air Act‖); Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  EPA will argue that 
neither § 7004 nor § 3006(e) contain any specific dates or 
timelines, but instead contain discretionary ―within a reasonable 
time‖ timeframes.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6974, 6926(b) (2006).  As 
such, EPA will argue that CARE‘s § 7004(a) petition created no 
mandatory duty to commence enforcement actions. 
ISSUE II 
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provide jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE’s petition for 
revocation of EPA’s approval of New Union’s hazardous 
waste program, filed under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)? 
Relevant Statutory Provisions 
28 U.S.C. § 1331: ―The district courts shall have jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States.‖ 
5 U.S.C. § 553(e): ―Each agency shall give an interested 
person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule.‖ 
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Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides district court 
jurisdiction to order EPA to act on a petition filed pursuant to § 
553(e) of the APA. 
EPA and New Union argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not 
provide district court jurisdiction to order EPA to act on a petition 
filed pursuant to § 553(e) of the APA. 
Discussion 
CARE’s argument 
 CARE will argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides concurrent 
jurisdiction for district courts to order EPA to act on CARE‘s 
petition filed under § 553(e) of the APA because the EPA, in 
failing to act on CARE‘s petition, violated CARE‘s rights under 
the APA, and RCRA does not preclude review under the APA. 
a. EPA’s failure to act on CARE’s petition violated 
CARE’s rights under the rulemaking petition 
provision of the APA and therefore gave rise to a 
claim under the federal question statute, with the 
federal question jurisdiction of the district courts. 
The APA provides judicial review to any ―person suffering a 
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action. . .‖ 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).  CARE will 
argue that a right of review exists under the APA and that EPA‘s 
failure to take action on CARE‘s petition within a reasonable time 
violated CARE‘s right provided by the rulemaking petition 
provision (§ 553(e)) of the APA.  Section 553(e) of the APA states 
that ―[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right to 
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.‖  5 
U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006).  Although § 553(e) does not specifically 
provide that the agency has to respond, nor a timeframe within 
which it must respond, CARE will argue that such duties are 
implied by the statutory structure of the APA.  See In re Am. 
Rivers and Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 
2004).  Specifically, § 555(b) requires an agency to conclude a 
matter presented before it within a reasonable time and § 555(e) 
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requires an agency to give a petitioner prompt notice when the 
agency denies a petition, along with a brief statement setting 
forth the grounds for denial.  5 U.S.C. § 555(b) & (e) (2006).  
Furthermore, § 706(1) authorizes the reviewing court to ―compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.‖  5 
U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).  Finally, it defines ―agency action‖ to 
include a failure to act.  5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006).  CARE will 
argue that these various provisions, taken together, create a 
mandatory duty on EPA to respond to rulemaking petitions 
submitted under § 553(e), and to do so within a reasonable time.  
The right to petition is an illusory right if the agency does not 
respond within a reasonable time. 
Precedent supports CARE‘s argument that EPA had a 
nondiscretionary duty to respond to the petition.  See Wisconsin 
Electric Power Co. v. Costle, 715 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing an affirmative duty to respond to petitions submitted 
under § 553(e) of the APA).  Although ―reasonable time‖ is not 
defined in the APA, a reasonable time for agency action is 
typically counted in weeks or months, not years.  See Am. Rivers, 
372 F.3d at 418; In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 
1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Since EPA received CARE‘s petition 
almost an entire year prior to CARE‘s filing of the present action, 
EPA‘s failure to respond during that entire time is unreasonable.  
Judicial review is available in the present case because when 
―administrative inaction has precisely the same impact on the 
rights of the parties as a denial of relief, an agency cannot 
preclude such review by casting its decision in the form of 
inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief.‖ Envtl. 
Def. Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir 1970); see also 
Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) [hereinafter TRAC] (holding that § 706(1) coupled with 
§ 555(b) of the APA ―does indicate a congressional view that 
agencies should act within reasonable time frames and that 
court‘s designated by statute to review agency actions may play 
an important role in compelling agency action. . .‖).  CARE will 
argue that in light of the above, EPA had a nondiscretionary duty 
to respond to the petition within a reasonable time.  Therefore, 
EPA‘s failure to respond creates a cause of action under the APA.  
As outlined supra Issue I, CARE will argue that its petition was 
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properly filed pursuant to § 553(e) because EPA‘s approval of 
New Union‘s state program was a rulemaking. 
b. RCRA’s citizen suit provision does not preclude 
review under the APA. 
CARE will argue that, in addition to the right of review 
provided by the specific environmental statute in question, the 
APA provides a concurrent basis of review of federal agency 
actions.  Generally, instances where agency actions (which, by 
APA definition, include inaction) are not subject to judicial review 
under the specific environmental statute, so long as the citizen 
suit provision within the specific statute does not specifically 
preclude review available under the APA, the APA will provide 
an independent basis for review of the agency action.  For 
example, in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), petitioners 
brought an action pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA), seeking review of a Biological 
Opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service that concluded 
that the irrigation project in question would jeopardize two 
endangered species of fish.  Id.  There, the Supreme Court held 
that even though ESA‘s citizen suit provision did not provide for 
review of the actions in question, review was nonetheless 
available under the APA since the ESA did not preclude such 
review.  Id.  See also Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D. D.C. 2007) (finding that 
the Clean Water Act‘s citizen suit provision did not preclude APA 
review). 
CARE will argue that in the present case, RCRA‘s citizen suit 
provision does not preclude review of agency action under the 
APA, and that to the contrary, the provision contains a savings 
clause which provides that ―[n]othing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under 
any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard 
or requirement. . .or to seek any other relief (including relief 
against the Administrator or a State agency).‖  42 U.S.C. § 
6972(f) (2006).  CARE will argue that inclusion of this savings 
clause clearly indicates that RCRA does not preclude review of 
EPA‘s inaction under the APA. 
As further support for this argument, CARE will rely on 
Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982).  There the 
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District of Massachusetts held that the savings clause of the 
CWA preserves a right of review under the APA and jurisdiction 
under the federal question statute for the approval of a permit by 
the Army Corps. of Engineers under § 404 of the CWA.  Id. at 77-
79.  Moreover, many courts have reviewed federal actions 
violating the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act under the APA.  
See e.g., City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 692-93 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (seeking a review of the Administrator‘s promulgation 
of indirect source regulations pursuant to § 110 of the CAA); 
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 664 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (seeking review of the Administrator‘s  refusal to revise 
previously promulgated standards of performance for new coal-
fired power plants pursuant to the CAA); Natural Res. Def. 
Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (seeking 
review of the Administrator‘s failure to publish effluent limitation 
guidelines called for by § 304(b)(1)(A) of the CWA); Atl. Terminal 
Urban Renewal Coal. v. New York City Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 697 
F. Supp. 666, 668 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (seeking review of HUD‘s 
preliminary approval of a development project despite the final 
environmental impact statement citing possible adverse impacts). 
RCRA‘s citizen suit provision is almost identical to the 
provisions found in the ESA, CWA, and CAA.  Compare 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604 (2006) with 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006) and 33 U.S.C. § 
1365 (2006).  CARE will argue that, as such, even if it was 
determined that § 7002(a)(2) does not provide jurisdiction to 
district courts to compel the EPA to act on CARE‘s petition for 
revocation of EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s hazardous waste 
program, jurisdiction for the District Court is still available under 
the APA. 
EPA and New Union’s argument 
a. RCRA displaces the APA under the maxim of 
statutory construction that the specific statute 
governs over the general statute. 
EPA and New Union will argue that there is no federal 
question jurisdiction for the District Court because § 7004 of 
RCRA is the specific authority for rulemaking petitions under 
RCRA, and therefore displaces § 553(e) of APA, which provides 
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general authority for rulemaking petitions.  In support of this 
argument, EPA and New Union will cite the maxim of statutory 
interpretation that the specific governs over the general.  EPA 
and New Union will rely on cases such as Green v. Bock Laundry 
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1989) (―A general statutory 
rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific 
rule.‖).  See also Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658 
(1997); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 
(1961). 
EPA and New Union will argue that § 553(e) of the APA 
requires an agency to give an interested person the right to 
petition and nothing else.  5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006).  Section 
7004(a) provides that ―[w]ithin a reasonable time following 
receipt of such petition, the Administrator shall take action with 
respect to such petition and shall publish notice of such action in 
the Federal Register, together with the reasons therefor.‖  42 
U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  EPA and New Union will argue that 
since the substance (RCRA-related questions) and procedures 
(reasonable time) set forth in RCRA § 7004(a) are more specific 
than the statutory minimum set forth in § 553(e) of the APA, 
RCRA § 7004 entirely displaces the APA § 553(e). 
New Union’s argument 
a. CARE’s petition under § 553(e) is improper because 
withdrawal of approval of a state program is an 
order, not a rule. 
New Union will reassert its argument, supra section I-A, that 
the withdrawal of approval of a state program is an order, not a 
rule.  New Union will argue that since § 553(e) of the APA 
provides that ―[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the 
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule,‖ 
CARE‘s petition under § 553(e) of the EPA is improper.  5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(e) (2006).  Therefore, CARE‘s petition, filed pursuant to § 
553(e), fails to state a claim. 
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ISSUE III 
Whether EPA’s failure to act on CARE’s petition 
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a 
constructive determination that New Union’s program 
continued to meet criteria for program approval under 
RCRA § 3006(b), both subject to judicial review under 
RCRA 7006(b) 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that EPA‘s failure to act on the petition 
constituted constructive denial of the petition and a constructive 
determination that New Union‘s program continues to meet the 
criteria for approval, and that both actions are subject to judicial 
review. 
EPA and New Union argue that inaction on CARE‘s petition 
is not a constructive action of any kind and is therefore not 
subject to judicial review. 
Discussion 
CARE argues that EPA‘s failure to act on the petition 
constituted a constructive denial of the petition and a 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continues 
to meet RCRA‘s criteria for approval.  This argument rests on the 
well-established doctrine of ―constructive submission.‖  See Scott 
v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); Alaska Ctr. for 
the Env’t v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Sierra 
Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993). 
The constructive submission doctrine was originally crafted 
in the context of CWA § 303(d), which governs the total maximum 
daily loads (TMDLs) of pollutants that can be discharged into 
waters within a state‘s boundaries for which the effluent 
limitations are not stringent enough to implement any water 
quality standards or for which controls on thermal discharges are 
not stringent enough to ensure protection and propagation of fish 
and wildlife.  33 U.S.C. § 1331(d) (2006).  It also imposes a 
statutory timeline within which states and EPA are to 
promulgate TMDLs.  Id.  The rationale behind the constructive 
submission doctrine is set forth in Scott.  There, the Seventh 
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Circuit held that a state‘s ―refusal to [submit TMDLs] would 
amount to a determination that no TMDL is necessary and none 
should be provided.‖  Scott, 741 F.2d. at 998.  This amounted to a 
―constructive submission‖ of no TMDLs.  Id.  Because the statute 
required EPA to establish TMDLs if the states did not, the state‘s 
long-term refusal to establish and submit TMDLs triggered a 
mandatory duty on the part of EPA to do so.  The court went on to 
state that where a court determines that the ―states have made a 
constructive submission of no TMDLs, the failure of the EPA to 
act would amount to failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty. . 
.‖  Id.  Scott further held that inaction by EPA would be 
considered ―tantamount to approval of state decisions. . .‖  Id.  
The court reasoned that it was unwilling to let an important 
aspect of the federal scheme for water pollution control to be 
frustrated by the refusal of the states to act.  Id. at 997. 
First, it must be determined whether EPA‘s failure to 
respond to the petition was an unreasonable delay constituting a 
constructive denial of the petition.  Second, if EPA‘s failure to 
respond to the petition constitutes a constructive denial, the 
question is whether that denial constitutes a constructive 
continued approval of New Union‘s state program. 
CARE’s argument 
a. EPA’s failure to respond to CARE’s petition was an 
unreasonable delay and therefore constituted a 
constructive denial of the petition, subject to judicial 
review. 
CARE will argue that EPA‘s failure to act on the petition 
constituted a constructive denial of the petition because a 
§7004(a) petition requesting that EPA repeal its authorization of 
a state program imposes a clear-cut mandatory duty on EPA to 
respond to the petition.  Section 271.23 sets forth the regulatory 
procedures for withdrawing approval of State programs under § 
3006(e) of RCRA, and states in pertinent part that the 
―Administrator shall respond in writing to any petition to 
commence withdrawal proceedings. . .‖  40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (2010) 
(emphasis added).  It goes on to state that the Administer may 
conduct an informal investigation of the allegations in the 
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petition to determine whether cause exists to commence 
proceedings.  Id.  CARE will argue that the last two sentences, 
read together, clearly impose a mandatory duty on the 
Administrator to respond in writing to such petitions, regardless 
of whether the Administrator determines that a cause exists to 
commence proceedings.  See United States ex rel. Siegel v. 
Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 360 (1895) (holding that when the same 
rule uses both ‗may‘ and ‗shall‘, the normal inference is that each 
is used in its usual sense-the one act being permissive, the other 
mandatory).  Citing the very short ―not to exceed ninety days‖ 
statutory time limit of § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) and the 
―within a reasonable time‖ requirement of § 7004(a), U.S.C. § 
6974(a), in conjunction with the language of C.F.R. § 271.23, 
CARE will argue that EPA had a mandatory duty to act on the 
petition and to do so within a reasonable time.  CARE will argue 
that EPA‘s failure to act on the petition over the course of almost 
one year was an unreasonable delay, therefore amounting to a 
constructive denial of CARE‘s petition.  See In re Int’l Chem. 
Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding 
that even though there is no per se rule as to how long is too long 
to wait for agency action, a reasonable time for agency action is 
typically counted in weeks or months, not years). 
Although courts have not expressly defined what constitutes 
―unreasonable delay‖, they are guided by various factors in 
making such a determination.  In TRAC, 750 F.2d 70, 79-80 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984), the court set forth a six-factor test for assessing claims 
of unreasonable delay.  The test sets forth the following factors: 
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by 
a ―rule of reason,‖; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable 
or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency 
to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may 
supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be 
reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable 
when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should 
consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency 
activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should 
also take into account the nature and extent of the interests 
prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any 
impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that 
agency action is unreasonably delayed. 
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Id. (internal citations omitted) 
In TRAC, the court, citing to the complexity of the regulation, 
held that a delay of five years on a rate return inquiry and two on 
the proper ratemaking treatment was not unreasonable.  Id. at 
80.  CARE will argue that application of the six-factor test does 
not warrant a similar conclusion in the case at bar. 
Further, CARE will argue that since EPA‘s inaction had 
precisely the same impact on the rights of CARE as that of a 
denial, and therefore constructive denial subject to judicial 
review. 
See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. 
Cir 1970) (―When administrative inaction has precisely the same 
impact on the rights of the parties as denial of relief, an agency 
cannot preclude judicial review by casting its decision in the form 
of inaction rather than in the form of an order denying relief‖, 
and that the Secretary‘s inaction with regard to the request for 
suspension was tantamount to an order denying suspension.). 
b. EPA’s inaction on CARE’s petition constituted a 
constructive determination that New Union’s 
program continued to meet RCRA’s criteria for 
program approval under RCRA § 3006(b). 
All of the allegations set forth in CARE‘s petition were 
obtained from documents and reports that New Union submitted 
directly to EPA.  CARE will argue that EPA has been aware of 
the egregious inadequacies and failures of New Union‘s program 
from the dates on which they were reported, many of them dating 
as far back as 2000.  CARE will argue that EPA‘s failure to 
commence withdrawal proceedings in the course of an entire 
decade is contrary to the statutory time-period set forth in § 
3006(e) of RCRA.  The notion that EPA‘s inaction should be 
permitted to frustrate a critical mechanism for achieving RCRA‘s 
objectives is highly unlikely.  As such, the rationale for finding a 
constructive submission in the TMDL cases is just as convincing 
as a rationale for finding a ―constructive‖ determination in the 
present case.  CARE will argue that EPA‘s constructive denial of 
CARE‘s petition to repeal EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s 
program is tantamount to an approval of New Union‘s state 
hazardous waste program.  See Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 
F.2d 992, 998 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that inaction by EPA is 
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considered to be ―tantamount to approval of state decisions that 
TMDLs are unneeded‖); U.S. Brewers Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 
974, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that the ―Administrator‘s 
refusal to repeal his regulation was, for jurisdictional purposes, 
equivalent to its promulgation and therefore reviewable‖). 
CARE may also argue that ―TMDL cases‖ where courts held 
the constructive submission theory inapplicable were instances 
where the States had either (a) submitted some TMDLs, or (b) 
demonstrated a good-faith interest in developing TMDLs.  See 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fox, 93 F. Supp.2d 531, 540 
(S.D. N.Y. 2000); Sierra Club, North Star Chapter v. Browner, 
843 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (D. Minn.1993); San Francisco Baykeeper 
v. Whitman, 297 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2002).  Distinguishing 
those cases from the present action, CARE will argue that there 
is nothing to suggest that EPA has any intention of commencing 
withdrawal proceedings; nor are there any facts to suggest that 
New Union has plans to bring its state hazardous waste program 
into compliance.  The absence of such intentions warrants the 
application of the constructive action doctrine to the present case, 
thereby leading to a finding that EPA‘s failure to act on the 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings amounted to a 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continues 
to meet the requirements outlined in § 3006(b) of RCRA.  See 
Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1425, 1429 
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that a finding of a constructive 
submission rested on the facts that Alaska had not submitted any 
TMDLs whatsoever and had no intention of preparing any in the 
future). 
c. The two constructive actions are both subject to 
judicial review under RCRA 7006(b). 
CARE will argue that EPA‘s constructive denial of its 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings under § 3006(e) of 
RCRA and constructive determination that New Union‘s program 
continues to meet RCRA criteria for program approval under § 
3006(b) are both subject to judicial review under § 7006(b) of 
RCRA.  In support of its position, CARE will draw attention to 
the language of § 7006(b) of RCRA, and argue that it clearly 
indicates Congress‘s intent that jurisdiction for review of EPA 
actions pertaining to state programs be in the Court of Appeals. 
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―To avoid unintended anomalous results, statutes 
authorizing review of specified agency actions should be 
construed to allows review of agency actions which are 
‗functionally similar‘ or ‗tantamount to‘ those specified actions.‖  
Vineland Chem. Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 1987).  See 
also Modine Mfg. Corp. v. Kay, 791 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 1986).  
CARE will argue that in the case at bar, EPA‘s failure to respond 
to the petition is a constructive denial of the petition, which in 
turn is tantamount to a continued approval of New Union‘s state 
program, and therefore both actions are subject to judicial review 
under § 7006(b) of RCRA. 
With regard to CARE‘s constructive determination argument, 
CARE will also argue that EPA has had years to commence 
withdrawal proceedings from the time when it was initially 
presented with evidence of the many inadequacies of New Union‘s 
state hazardous waste program.  Despite having this knowledge, 
EPA has continuously failed to take any action to repeal its initial 
authorization of New Union‘s program (which was a rulemaking).  
CARE will also argue that EPA‘s refusal to repeal the regulation 
is equivalent to its promulgation and is thus reviewable under § 
3006(b).  See U.S. Brewers Ass’n, 600 F.2d at 978 (―The 
Administrator‘s refusal to repeal his regulation was, for 
jurisdictional purposes, equivalent to its promulgation and 
therefore reviewable.‖). 
EPA and New Union’s argument 
a. EPA’s delay in responding to CARE’s petition is not a 
constructive denial of the petition because the delay 
is not unreasonable. 
EPA and New Union will argue that the constructive 
submission doctrine set forth in Scott and other cases dealing 
with TMDLs are distinguishable from the present case.  In 
holding that states‘ failure to submit TMDLs constitutes a 
―constructive submission‖ of no TMDLs, which in turn imposes a 
mandatory duty on EPA to take action, the Court pointed to the 
statutory time limits set forth in CWA § 303(d).  EPA and New 
Union will argue that unlike Scott, where § 303(d) sets forth 
explicit statutory time limits, in the case at bar, § 7004(a) sets no 
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specific time limits, but instead sets forth a deferential ―within a 
reasonable time‖ standard.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6974(a) (2006).  As 
such, EPA‘s failure to respond to the petition should only 
constitute a constructive denial if the delay was unreasonable.  
EPA and New Union will argue courts have generally found a 
delay to be unreasonable when an agency has failed to act for a 
number of years.  See Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 
997 (7th Cir. 1984); Nader v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm., 520 F.2d 
182, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
Here, only a year has passed between the time CARE served 
its petition and commenced this action in the District Court.  As 
such, this does not warrant a conclusion that EPA‘s inaction 
constitutes a constructive denial of CARE‘s petition or a 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continues 
to meet RCRA‘s criteria for approval under § 3006(b).  See 
Midwest Gas Users Ass’n v. FERC, 833 F.2d 341, 359 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (holding that generally a reasonable time for an agency 
action could encompass ―months, occasionally a year or two. . .‖); 
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340 (D.C. Cir.1980). 
b. EPA’s decision not to commence withdrawal 
proceedings as a response to a citizen petition is an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and is therefore 
immune from judicial review. 
EPA and New Union will argue that courts have consistently 
held that judicial review is not available in situations where the 
agency‘s action is subject to agency discretion.  See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (holding that an agency‘s 
decision not to take an enforcement action is presumed immune 
from judicial review); Mobil Oil Explorations & Producing Se. Inc. 
v. United Distribution, 498 U.S. 211 (1991); Block v. Cmty. 
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984).  EPA‘s inaction on CARE‘s 
petition to commence withdrawal proceedings was an exercise of 
its discretion not to undertake enforcement actions, and therefore 
not subject to judicial review. 
c. EPA’s inaction on the petition does not constitute a 
consistent failure to act and therefore does not 
constitute a constructive determination that New 
Union’s program continues to meet RCRA’s criteria 
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
03 JUDGES_MEMO 4/24/2011  2:25 AM 
50   PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1 
for approval under § 3006(b). 
EPA and New Union may contend that even if it is assumed 
that an explicit statutory timeline is not required or that EPA‘s 
inaction was not an exercise of discretion pertaining to 
enforcement actions, such inaction still fails to amount to a 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program meets 
RCRA‘s approval criteria.  EPA and New Union will call attention 
to the fact that the allegations contained in CARE‘s petition stem 
from facts that were reported to EPA in New Union‘s 2009 annual 
report and, as such, CARE‘s contention that EPA has 
continuously failed to take action over a period of several years is 
inaccurate.  Further, the facts that EPA has assisted New 
Union‘s DEP to inspect a number of facilities in 2009, and has 
promised to do so again in 2010, provides further support that 
EPA did indeed undertake actions to ensure that New Union 
continues to operate a state program that is consistent with the 
federal statutory scheme.  As such, EPA and New Union will 
stress that inaction on the petition did not constitute a 
constructive determination. 
ISSUE IV 
Assuming the answer to issue III is positive and the 
answer to either or both of issues I and II is positive, 
should this Court: (1) lift the stay in C.A. No. 18-2010 and 
proceed with judicial review of EPA’s constructive 
actions; or (2) remand the case to the district court to 
order EPA to conduct proceedings to consider withdrawal 
of approval of New Union’s hazardous waste program? 
Relevant Statutory Provisions 
§ 7006(b)(2), RCRA‘s judicial review provision: ―Review of 
the Administrator‘s action in granting, denying, or withdrawing 
authorization or interim authorization under section 6926 of this 
title, may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of 
Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in 
which such person resides or transacts such business. . .Any such 
application shall be made within ninety days from the day of such 
issuance, denial, modification, revocation, grant, or withdrawal, 
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or after such date only if such application is based solely on 
grounds which arose after such ninetieth day. . .‖ 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that the Court should lift the stay and proceed 
with judicial review rather than remanding to the lower court. 
EPA and New Union argue that the Court should not lift the 
stay, but instead remand the case to the court below to order EPA 
to initiate proceedings under RCRA §§ 3006(e) and 7004. 
Discussion 
If this Court determines that EPA‘s inaction on the petition 
amounted to a constructive denial of the petition and a 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continues 
to meet RCRA‘s approval criteria, this court can either lift the 
stay in C.A.No. 18-2010 and proceed with judicial review of EPA‘s 
constructive actions, or remand the case to the lower court to 
order EPA to initiate and complete proceedings.  The questions 
that must be resolved to determine which course to take are: (1) 
whether § 7006(b) confers jurisdiction for judicial review for 
EPA‘s failure to withdraw approval; (2) whether judicial review of 
EPA‘s constructive actions is time-barred; and (3) whether there 
are judicial economy and other policy issues. 
Conclusion: For the reasons set forth in EPA and New 
Union‘s arguments this Court should remand the case to the 
lower court. 
CARE’s argument 
a. EPA’s failure to act on CARE’s petition to initiate 
proceedings to withdraw authorization of New 
Union’s program constitutes a constructive grant of 
continued approval by EPA of New Union’s program, 
and this Court should lift the stay and proceed with 
judicial review under § 7006(b). 
CARE will argue that, EPA‘s failure to act on the petition to 
commence withdrawal proceedings constituted an agency action.  
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As such, EPA‘s constructive determination that New Union‘s 
program continues to meet RCRA‘s criteria for program approval 
is, in essence, equivalent to a grant of authorization of the state 
program under the circumstances that exist today.  In support of 
this argument, CARE will cite to Maier v. U.S. E.P.A., 114 F.3d 
1032 (10th Cir. 1997), in which the issue was whether EPA‘s 
denial of a petition to institute rulemaking constituted an ―action 
. . . in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other 
limitation. . .‖ under the CWA.  Id. at 1037.  The court 
determined that the denial of the petition constituted an action 
approving or promulgating regulations.  Id.  See also Scott v. City 
of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
inaction by EPA would be considered ―tantamount to approval of 
state decisions. . .‖); Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 
F.2d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that the Administrator‘s 
failure to revise the rule under the CAA ―constituted a failure to 
perform a nondiscretionary duty. . .‖).  CARE will argue that a 
similar conclusion is warranted in the present case.  Since § 
7006(b) grants jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals for judicial 
review of EPA‘s action in granting authorization under § 3006, 
this Court has jurisdiction to review the case.  CARE will argue 
that thereby, in keeping with the unambiguously expressed will 
of Congress, this Court should lift the stay and proceed with 
judicial review of EPA‘s constructive actions. 
b. The statutory language of § 7006(b) indicates 
Congress’s intention that jurisdiction for review of 
all of EPA’s actions regarding state programs be in 
the Court of Appeals. 
CARE will argue that the judicial review provision of § 
7006(b) should be read broadly to avoid unintended and 
anomalous results.  See Vineland Chem. Co. v. EPA, 810 F.2d 
402, 405 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that ―to avoid unintended and 
anomalous results, statutes authorizing review of specified 
agency actions should be construed to allow review of agency 
actions which are ―functionally similar‖ or ―tantamount to‖ those 
specified actions.‖).  See also Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 
445 U.S. 193 (1980) (cautioning not to construe appellate review 
provisions too narrowly); Modine Mfg. Corp. v. Kay, 791 F.2d 267, 
267 (3d Cir. 1986) (same). 
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CARE will argue that § 7006(b)‘s grant of jurisdiction to the 
Court of Appeals for judicial review of EPA‘s action in ―granting, 
denying, or withdrawing authorization or interim authorization 
under § 6926. . .‖ constitutes all possible actions that EPA could 
take regarding whether state programs meet RCRA‘s criteria for 
approval.  42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (2006).  CARE will argue that this 
clearly indicates that Congress intended jurisdiction for review of 
all EPA actions regarding state programs be in this Court.  Since 
CARE appeals EPA‘s constructive authorization of New Union‘s 
state hazardous program, the essence of CARE‘s claim lies under 
§ 7006(b) of RCRA.  As further support, CARE will cite to the last 
sentence of § 7006(b), which states that ―[s]uch review shall be in 
accordance with sections 701 through 706 of Title 5.‖  Id. 
Specifically, § 701(b)(2) refers to § 551 of the APA for definitions.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (2006).  As mentioned previously, § 
551(13) defines an ―agency action‖ to include a failure to act.  5 
U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006) (emphasis added). 
CARE will argue that because EPA‘s inaction was equivalent 
to a constructive approval, EPA in essence granted authorization 
to New Union for its modified hazardous program, and therefore 
its constructive actions are subject to judicial review under § 
7006(b). 
c. Considerations to judicial economy cautions against 
remand to the lower court. 
Remanding this case to the district court while 
simultaneously holding that EPA constructively denied CARE‘s 
petition, makes little sense.  CARE‘s appeal of EPA‘s denial on 
remand will ultimately be in this court.  Furthermore, given that 
all facts alleged by CARE are uncontested and all parties agree 
that no further facts are necessary to decide the matter, a 
sufficient factual record exists for appellate review.  Only legal 
issues remain to be determined.  This Court is perfectly capable 
of deciding them on its own, with no preceding decision by the 
District Court.  Thus, with considerations to judicial economy and 
consistency, this Court should lift the stay and proceed with 
judicial review. 
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d. Judicial review under § 7006(b) of RCRA is not time-
barred. 
CARE will argue that judicial review is not time-barred 
because CARE is not seeking review of EPA‘s initial approval of 
New Union‘s program in 1986.  Rather, CARE is seeking review 
of EPA‘s constructive denial on the petition and EPA‘s 
constructive determination that New Union‘s program continues 
to meet RCRA‘s criteria for program approval.  CARE will argue 
that the 90-day statutory period begins to run upon a 
constructive denial of the petition, not when EPA acts or doesn‘t 
act.  Thus, the 90-day statutory period has not passed because an 
application for judicial review in this Court does not become 
available until after this Court makes the determination that 
EPA‘s inaction constituted constructive actions.  CARE will argue 
that only after such a determination could it then be argued that 
EPA‘s refusal to repeal the regulation is equivalent to its 
promulgation.  CARE will argue that since it made an application 
for judicial review at the same time as it sought a determination 
that EPA‘s inaction constituted constructive actions, judicial 
review under § 7006(b) is not time-barred. 
Additionally, CARE will argue that the petition is based on 
facts arising years after the initial approval and, therefore, the 
ninety-day statutory limit on filing an application for judicial 
review does not apply.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (2006) (any 
application for judicial review ―shall be made within ninety days 
from the date of such issuance, denial, modification, revocation, 
grant, or withdrawal, or after such date only if such application is 
based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth day‖). 
EPA and New Union’s argument 
a. § 7006(b) does not confer jurisdiction for judicial 
review of EPA’s determination not to withdraw 
authorization, and therefore this Court must remand 
to the District Court. 
When statutory language conferring jurisdiction is 
ambiguous, the court can resolve the ambiguity by reference to 
what Congress may have intended; but where the statutory 
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language conferring jurisdiction is unambiguous, the courts are 
―simply not at liberty to displace, or to improve upon, the 
jurisdictional choices of Congress. . .‖  Five Flags Pipe Line Co. v. 
Dep’t of Transp., 854 F.2d 1428, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  In such 
instances, the courts have ―just so much jurisdiction as Congress 
has provided by Statute.‖  Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 
792 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  See also Vineland, 810 F.2d at 405 (―The 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is limited to that conferred by 
statute.‖); Modine Mfg. Corp. v. Kay, 791 F.2d 267, 270 (3d Cir. 
1986); Hempstead County & Nevada County Project v. EPA, 700 
F.2d 459, 461 (8th Cir.1983); City of Baton Rouge v. EPA, 620 
F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir.1980). 
EPA and New Union will argue that in the case at bar, CARE 
filed suit challenging EPA‘s failure to withdraw authorization of 
New Union‘s state hazardous waste program, not EPA‘s action in 
granting, denying, or withdrawing authorization.  Section 7006(b) 
unambiguously provides jurisdiction to the court of appeals to 
review the Administrator‘s action only in ―granting, denying, or 
withdrawing authorization or interim authorization under § 6926 
of [RCRA]. . .‖ and, as such, judicial review of CARE‘s challenged 
action falls outside the jurisdiction conferred by § 7006(b).  42 
U.S.C. § 6976(b) (2006); see United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 
821 F.2d 714, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that it could not 
review a petition challenging the EPA‘s failure to promulgate a 
rule under § 7006(a)(1) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1)).  Section 
6976(a)(1) confers jurisdiction to review actions of the 
Administrator in the promulgation, amendment, and repeal of a 
regulation.  42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (2006).  The court refused to 
expand the plain language of the statutory provision to include 
review of the EPA‘s failure to promulgate a rule.  United 
Technologies, 821 F.2d at 721.  EPA and New Union will argue 
that similar to United Technologies, this Court cannot expand the 
explicit statutory language of § 7006(b) to include EPA‘s failure to 
act.  Therefore, according to the plain meaning of the statutory 
provision, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review EPA‘s 
constructive actions and must remand this case to the court 
below. 
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b. RCRA provides district courts with explicit 
jurisdiction to govern citizen suits. 
EPA and New Union will argue that the citizen suit provision 
of RCRA provides that any civil suit brought against the 
Administrator for an alleged failure to perform a 
nondiscretionary duty ―may be brought in the district court for 
the district in which the alleged violation occurred or in the 
District Court of the District of Columbia. . .to order the 
Administrator to perform the act of duty.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2) 
(2006).  EPA and New Union will argue that a finding of 
constructive actions by the EPA requires first a finding that EPA 
failed to carry out a nondiscretionary duty.  As such, RCRA 
confers exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts.  See 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 
1986) (holding that where EPA‘s refusal to undertake rulemaking 
proceeding constitutes a failure to perform a mandatory duty, the 
district court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear the matter). 
c. Judicial review under § 7006(b) of RCRA is time-
barred. 
EPA and New Union will argue that even if this Court were 
to decide that EPA‘s inaction on the petition constituted 
constructive actions, the petition is still time-barred because 
CARE‘s application for judicial review was made far after the 
ninety-day window provided under § 7006(b).  Section 7006(b) 
states that any application for judicial review ―shall be made 
within ninety days from the date of such issuance, denial, 
modification, revocation, grant, or withdrawal, or after such date 
only if such application is based solely on grounds which arose 
after such ninetieth day.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (2006).  EPA and 
New Union will argue that this Court may not enlarge or alter 
the filing period provided under § 6976(b) because the filing 
period is jurisdictional in nature.  See Natural Res. Def. Council 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 977 (D.C. Cir.1979); New York 
v. United States, 568 F.2d 887, 892 (2d Cir. 1977); B.J. McAdams, 
Inc. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 1977); Chem-Haulers, 
Inc. v. United States, 536 F.2d 610, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1976); 
Microwave Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 
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1974).  Further, filing periods serve ―the important purpose of 
imparting finality into the administrative process, thereby 
conserving administrative resources and protecting the reliance 
interests of regulatees who conform their conduct to the 
regulations.‖  Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 666 F.2d at 602. 
EPA and New Union will argue that CARE‘s action is time-
barred because CARE failed to file the application for review 
within 90-days from the date of such issuance, denial, 
modification, revocation, grant, or withdrawal.  Specifically, 
CARE alleges that New Union‘s hazardous waste program no 
longer met the criteria for EPA approval for a number of years.  
Most of the facts relied upon by CARE date back, at the very 
latest, to 2000.  (R. at 5, 11, 12).  As such, if these failures are 
deemed to constitute constructive actions, CARE clearly failed to 
file an application for judicial review within the 90-day statutory 
period.  Furthermore, since CARE clearly filed suit on grounds 
dating so far back, CARE is not entitled to the exception to the 
90-day provision, because that exception requires that application 
be based solely on grounds occurring after such 90-day period.  
EPA and New Union will argue that since judicial review is time-
barred, the only possible alternative is to remand this case to the 
District Court to order EPA to initiate proceedings under § 
3006(e). 
d. There is no record available to review and therefore 
the Court should remand the case to the court below. 
EPA and New Union will argue that EPA has not developed 
any administrative record by which this court can review EPA‘s 
alleged constructive actions.  As the Supreme Court held in Camp 
v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), ―the focal point for judicial 
review should be the administrative record already in existence, 
not some new record completed initially in the reviewing court.‖  
EPA and New Union will argue that since no administrative 
record exists, this Court will not be able to engage in any 
meaningful review of EPA‘s alleged constructive actions.  See 
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir 1970) 
(holding it is impossible to have a meaningful appellate review 
without any record of the administrative action).  Relying on 
Camp and Hardin, EPA and New Union will argue that this court 
should remand the case to the lower court. 
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ISSUE V 
Must EPA withdraw its approval of New Union’s 
program because its resources and performance fail to 
meet RCRA’s approval criteria? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that New Union‘s resources and performance 
are not sufficient and that EPA must therefore withdraw its 
approval of New Union‘s program. 
EPA and New Union argue that New Union‘s resources and 
performance are sufficient and that even if they were insufficient, 
EPA has discretion to take action other than withdrawing 
approval. 
Discussion 
The EPA is authorized to approve state administered RCRA 
programs under § 3006 of RCRA.  42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2006).  The 
EPA shall approve state programs unless the state program is (1) 
not equivalent to the Federal program, (2) is inconsistent with the 
Federal or State programs applicable in other States, and (3) does 
not provide adequate enforcement of compliance with the 
requirements of this subchapter.  Id.  EPA regulations set forth a 
continuing obligation for states to meet these requirements: ―Any 
State program approved by the Administrator shall at all times 
be conducted in accordance with the requirements of this 
subpart.‖  40 C.F.R. § 271.1(g) (2010) (titled ―Requirements for 
Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Programs‖).  If a state 
gains EPA‘s approval of a program, but subsequently modifies the 
program or carries it out in such a way so that it does not meet 
the standards set forth in § 3006, then the EPA has the authority 
to withdraw its approval of the non-complying state program.  42 
USC § 6926(e) (2006).  While this authority is clear, the lingering 
question is whether EPA is required to withdraw its approval of a 
state program that is no longer in compliance. 
Relevant here is the third exception to approval, which 
implicitly entails an assessment of the adequacy of a state‘s 
resources and performance in enforcing compliance.  The issues 
that must be determined are whether New Union‘s program 
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provides adequate enforcement of compliance with RCRA, and 
whether EPA is required to withdraw authorization if it is 
determined that New Union‘s resources and performance fail to 
meet this requirement. 
CARE’s argument 
Care will argue that New Union‘s resources and performance 
are insufficient to adequately enforce compliance with RCRA and 
that EPA must therefore withdraw its approval of New Union‘s 
program. 
a. New Union’s resources and performance are 
insufficient to meet RCRA’s requirements for 
program approval and thus EPA must withdraw 
approval. 
In order to operate a state program in lieu of the federal 
program, RCRA requires a state to adequately administer and 
enforce its program in accordance with the federal statutory 
scheme.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006).  In its regulations, EPA 
specifies various failures which may warrant withdrawal of state 
authorization, which include the failure to issue permits, inspect 
regulated facilities, and to take enforcement actions for 
violations.  See 40 C.F.R. § 272.22(a)(2), (3) (2010).  CARE will 
argue that New Union lacks the personnel and financial 
resources to adequately perform any of these basic requirements, 
rendering its program out of compliance with RCRA; as such, 
EPA‘s constructive approval of its continued compliance with 
RCRA was clearly erroneous. 
First, § 3005(c)(3) of RCRA states that any permits issued to 
TSDs are to be for a fixed term, not to exceed 10 years.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 6925(c)(3) (2006).  CARE will point out that New Union clearly 
fails to comply with the permitting requirement because New 
Union‘s 2009 annual report to EPA indicates that over 900 
regulated facilities have expired permits, some having expired 20 
years ago.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p.20).  Second, § 3007(e) of RCRA 
imposes mandatory inspections of every single treatment, 
storage, and disposal facility (TSD) no less than every two years.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 6927(e) (2006).  However, the 2009 Annual Report 
to EPA indicates that New Union DEP inspected 150 TSDs 
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during the last year and solicited EPA to inspect a comparable 
number of facilities, and that it expected to perform at the same 
level this year.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p.23).  CARE will argue that 
the DEP and EPA together inspect only 20% of all facilities every 
year, well short of the 50% needed to inspect all TSDs every other 
year, as required by § 3007(e) of RCRA.  Further, the 2009 
Annual Report indicates there were 22 significant permit 
violations and 100s of minor violations.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, 
p.24).  Yet, New Union took only six enforcement actions.  Id. at 
25.  CARE will argue that New Union is clearly incapable of 
undertaking enforcement actions to adequately enforce RCRA or 
assure the health and safety of its citizens.  CARE will argue 
that, because it is clear that New Union‘s program fails to meet 
the requirements for program approval, EPA must withdraw 
approval of the program. 
b. Section 3006(e) imposes a non-discretionary duty on 
EPA to withdraw program approval. 
CARE will argue that the plain language of RCRA § 3006(e) 
imposes a mandatory duty on EPA to commence withdrawal 
proceedings because it states that when the Administrator 
determines that a state is no longer administering and enforcing 
its program in accordance with the requirements set forth in § 
3006(b), the Administrator ―shall notify the state and, if 
appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable 
time, the Administrator shall withdraw authorization of such 
program. . .‖  42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006) (emphasis added).  CARE 
will argue that since Congress does not give EPA discretion on 
the course of action to take upon a determination by EPA that a 
state program is not in compliance, Congress imposed a 
mandatory duty on EPA to commence the proceedings to make 
such a determination.  To support its assertion, CARE will cite to 
cases interpreting an almost identical provision of the CWA.  
Compare  42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006)  with 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) 
(2006).  In Save the Valley, Inc. v. EPA, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 
(S.D. Ind. 2000), the court rejected EPA‘s argument that 
‗whenever the Administrator determines‘ indicates EPA has 
discretion to initiate withdrawal proceedings and instead held 
that ―we read the CWA to impose a mandatory duty on the 
Administrator to make the requisite finding or determination 
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when he becomes aware of such violations. . .‖  See also S. 
Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 129 (D. 
S.C. 1978); Illinois v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Ill. 
1977); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 
1183 (D. Ariz. 1975).  CARE will argue that when Congress 
enacts a statute, it has previous statutes in mind which relate to 
the same subject matter.  Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 813 
(7th Cir. 1991).  Since the language in the relevant provisions of 
RCRA and CWA are almost identical, CARE will argue that 
Congress intended to impose the same mandatory duty on EPA to 
commence proceedings to make this determination under RCRA. 
EPA and New Union’s Argument 
EPA and New Union will argue that New Union‘s resources 
and performance are sufficient for EPA‘s continued approval of 
New Union‘s program, and that even if they were insufficient, 
EPA has discretion to take action other than withdrawing 
approval. 
a. New Union’s resources and performance are 
sufficient and therefore do not fall under any of the 
criteria for program withdrawal set forth in 40 
C.F.R. § 271.22. 
RCRA authorizes the Administrator to withdraw 
authorization of a state program whenever she determines that a 
state program is no longer in compliance with the requirements 
for program approval, and after giving notice to the state, the 
state fails to take corrective actions to bring its program into 
compliance.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006).  In § 271.22, EPA has 
set forth circumstances of state noncompliance in which the 
Administrator may withdraw program approval.  See 40 C.F.R. § 
271.22 (2010).  These circumstances include: (1) failure to 
exercise control over activities required to be regulated, including 
failure to issue permits; (2) issuing permits that do not conform to 
the requirements set forth in RCRA; (3) failure to act on 
violations of permits; (4) failure to undertake adequate 
enforcement; and (5) failure to inspect facilities subject to 
regulation.  Id. § 271.22(a)(2), (3). 
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EPA and New Union will argue that New Union continues to 
exercise control over regulated activities by issuing permits, 
inspecting facilities, and undertaking enforcement actions.  The 
2009 Annual Report to EPA indicates that the New Union DEP 
issued 125 permits in 2009 and anticipated issuing another 125 
permits in 2010.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2009, p.19).  Second, the DEP 
and EPA together inspected approximately 300 TSDs in 2009 and 
the same is expected for 2010.  Id. at 22.  Additionally, New 
Union reported that 18 enforcement actions were taken in 2009.  
Id. at 26.  While the state cannot inspect 100% of the TSDs or 
enforce every permit violation, it does prioritize its inspections 
based on the greatest potential harm to the public health or the 
environment.  Id. at 23.  EPA and New Union will argue that 
with the continued support and assistance of EPA in performing 
inspections and prosecuting violators, the state has a manageable 
system for dealing with the worst offenders until such a time 
when the state can supply the DEP with more resources. 
EPA and New Union will argue that since New Union has 
complied with the statutory and regulatory requirements, EPA 
correctly determined that New Union‘s program does not fit the 
circumstances set forth in § 271.22 under which the EPA may 
withdraw authorization. 
b. Even if New Union’s resources and performance are 
insufficient, EPA’s decision to withdraw is 
discretionary. 
EPA and New Union may argue that the RCRA language 
giving EPA authority to withdraw approval of state programs 
does not state that EPA must withdraw its approval in response 
to a state‘s noncompliance.  42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006).  Rather, 
the statute first requires EPA to determine if the state is 
administering its program in accordance with RCRA, and if it 
determines the state is out of compliance, then EPA is required to 
notify the state of its determination.  Id.  Only after the state fails 
to take appropriate action after notice is given is EPA required to 
withdraw its approval.  Id.  EPA and New Union will argue that 
policy considerations received in comments during the final rule 
making process lend further support to EPA‘s interpretation that 
§ 3006(e) grants discretion to EPA.  See Consolidated Permit 
Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,384 (May 19, 1980) (to be 
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codified at 40 C.F.R. § 123.14) (―One commenter thought that 
program withdrawal should be mandatory for any violation by a 
State of the requirements of this Part.  Such a requirement would 
be draconian and has been rejected by the Agency and the 
Courts.‖). 
EPA and New Union will argue that EPA is not even 
required to determine if the state is administering its program in 
accordance with RCRA.  Specifically, EPA and New Union will 
argue that numerous courts have held the phrase ‗whenever the 
Administrator determines‘ to indicate that EPA has discretion to 
initiate withdrawal proceedings of a state program.  This follows 
an analysis used by courts reviewing whether EPA must 
withdraw approval of state NPDES programs under the Clean 
Water Act (CWA).  See Sierra Club v. EPA, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 
1207 (N.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that ―the mandatory duty to 
withdraw approval arises only ‗whenever the Administrator 
determines after public hearing‘ that a state is not administering 
its NPDES program in accordance with federal standards.  The 
statute creates no express requirement that a public hearing be 
held at any specific time, or indeed ever, nor does the statute 
expressly require the EPA to make a determination. . .on the 
issue of whether a state is complying with federal law. . .‖).  See 
also Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977); Save the 
Bay v. Administrator, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.1977); Altman v. 
United States, 2004 WL 3019171 (W.D. N.Y 2004); Weatherby 
Lake Improvement Co. v. Browner, 1997 WL 687656 (W.D. Mo. 
1997); but see Save the Valley, Inc. v. EPA, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 
985 (S.D. Ind. 2000).  EPA and New Union will also point out that 
the language in the relevant provisions of RCRA and CWA are 
almost identical.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006) with 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (2006).  Additionally, Agency regulations for 
both the CWA and RCRA indicate that the Agency views program 
withdrawal as discretionary, since both regulations state the EPA 
―may‖ withdraw approval if a state fails to comply with program 
requirements.  EPA and New Union will argue that since the 
provisions of the two statutes are almost identical, the 
conclusions of the courts interpreting the CWA should be applied 
to the present case arising under RCRA. 
Furthermore, courts interpreting the phrase ‗whenever the 
Administrator determines‘ under the Clean Air Act (CAA) have 
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reached the same conclusion.  See Ohio Pub. Interest Research 
Group. v. Whitman, 386 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2004); New York 
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 330-31 
(2d Cir. 2003) (―key phrase. . .is the opening one, ‗Whenever the 
Administrator makes a determination,‘ and this language grants 
discretion. . .‖); Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900-03 
(9th Cir. 2001); Her Majesty the Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 
1533 (D.C. Cir.1990) (holding that statutory phrase ‗whenever‘ 
the Administrator ‗has reason to believe‘ implies a degree of 
discretion).  Applying the holdings in these cases, EPA and New 
Union will argue that, similarly here, since the determination is 
to occur whenever the EPA makes it, the determination is 
necessarily discretionary. 
c. Withdrawal is a drastic measure and EPA has 
several alternatives available to it short of 
withdrawal. 
EPA and New Union will argue that a complete withdrawal 
of a state‘s RCRA program is an extreme step and should be used 
as a last resort.  Courts deciding potential withdrawal of a state 
program under RCRA have recognized that withdrawal of 
approval is an extreme measure.  See United States v. Power 
Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2002); Waste Mgmt. 
of Illinois v. EPA, 714 F. Supp. 340, 341 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see also 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 181 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (interpreting the potential withdrawal of a state program 
under the CWA and holding that because of the administrative 
burden on EPA and the increased state-federal friction, the 
remedy is so drastic that EPA cannot be expected to use it except 
in egregious cases).  EPA and New Union will argue that CARE 
has failed to provide evidence of any such egregious violations as 
a result of the decreased funding and resources and, therefore, 
withdrawal is not warranted. 
The Waste Mgmt. of Illinois court pointed out ―to avoid such 
drastic measures, the U.S. EPA has promulgated regulations 
under which it may intervene in the granting and enforcement of 
state permits.‖  Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, 714 F. Supp. at 341.  
Courts have consistently held that EPA‘s enforcement rights 
under RCRA are not displaced by state authorization.  See 
Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999) 
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(recognizing that RCRA ―manifests a congressional intent to give 
the EPA a secondary enforcement right.‖); United States v. Elias, 
269 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. MacDonald & 
Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1991).  Specifically, 
the Waste Mgmt. of Illinois court pointed out that Congress gave 
the EPA authority to create many tools, short of withdrawing 
approval of the whole state program, to ensure state programs 
are in compliance with RCRA.  ―The Administrator may take 
enforcement action in a state with its own hazardous waste 
program, as long as he informs the state before taking action.‖ 
Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, 714 F. Supp. at 341; see also 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(a)(1), (2) (2006).  EPA may comment on state permit 
applications and draft permits, indicate actions the state should 
take to come into compliance with its program, and file its own 
enforcement actions in the state.  Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, 714 F. 
Supp. at 341-42; see also 40 C.F.R. § 271.19(a), (b), (e)(2) (2010).  
The EPA may, under section 3008(a)(3), revoke a permit or fine a 
violator up to $25,000 per day.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (2006); 
Waste Mgmt. of Illinois, 714 F. Supp. at 342.  Thus, EPA and New 
Union will argue that, even if New Union‘s resources are 
insufficient to carry out its RCRA program, the EPA has means 
available to ensure program compliance other than withdrawing 
program approval. 
Additionally, EPA and New Union will argue that it would 
create an unreasonable administrative burden on EPA to have to 
withdraw approval of a state program.  This is so because the 
EPA would have to put in place its own program in compliance 
with RCRA and administer it within the state.  See 42 USC § 
6926(e) (2006).  Putting in place such a replacement program may 
not be a realistic possibility for the EPA.  Even the Save the 
Valley court, which seemingly found that EPA was required to 
withdraw approval, did not require EPA to do so immediately 
given the administrative difficulties the agency would face in the 
absence of an approved state program.  See Save the Valley, Inc. 
v. EPA, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
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d. EPA’s decision to not commence withdrawal 
proceedings should be given deference because the 
decision is committed to agency discretion. 
EPA and New Union will argue that Congress does not 
unambiguously mandate that EPA commence withdrawal 
proceedings, and since there is ambiguity with respect to the 
specific question, EPA‘s interpretation of § 3006, as evidenced by 
EPA regulations, should be given deference.  See Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  EPA 
and New Union will argue that since the agency action contained 
in § 3006(e) of RCRA is committed to agency discretion by law, 
EPA‘s determination that New Union‘s program has sufficient 
resources and performance to meet RCRA‘s program 
requirements is unreviewable.  In Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill Inc. 
v. EPA, 377 Fed. App‘x 406, 408 (5th Cir. 2010), the court held 
that ―neither [RCRA] nor the regulations present standards by 
which we can review EPA‘s decision not to commence withdrawal 
proceedings.‖  See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 
(1985) (holding that review is unavailable ―if statute is drawn so 
that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to 
judge the agency‘s exercise of discretion.‖). 
ISSUE VI 
Must EPA withdraw its approval of New Union’s 
program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act effectively withdraws railroad 
hazardous waste facilities from regulation? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that since New Union does not regulate all 
facilities regulated by RCRA, EPA must withdraw its approval of 
New Union‘s program. 
EPA and New Union argue that New Union‘s present failure 
to regulate railroad hazardous waste facilities does not require 
EPA to withdraw its approval of the entire program. 
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Discussion 
New Union‘s Environmental Regulatory Adjustment Act 
(ERAA) amended New Union‘s Railroad Regulation Act (RRA) by: 
(1) establishing a railroad Commission charged with regulating 
all aspects of New Union‘s intrastate railroad; (2) transferring all 
standard setting, permitting, inspection, and enforcement 
authorities from the DEP to the Commission; and (3) removing 
criminal sanctions for violations of environmental statutes by 
facilities falling under the jurisdiction of the Commission.  (Rec. 
doc. 5 for 2000, pp.103-05).  The issue here is whether this 
amendment renders New Union‘s program inconsistent with 
Federal requirements, thereby requiring withdrawal. 
Conclusion: EPA is required to withdraw approval because 
states are not allowed to have partial programs. 
CARE’s argument 
CARE will argue that EPA is required to withdraw approval 
of New Union‘s program because § 3006(g) contemplates partial 
state programs only to the extent necessary to continue approval 
of state programs approved prior to 1984, while they add 
elements necessary to comply with the 1984 amendments to 
RCRA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(g) (2006).  ERAA amended the RAA 
to effectively withdraw railroad hazardous waste facilities from 
regulation, rendering New Union‘s program inconsistent with the 
Federal program. 
a. ERAA is inconsistent with RCRA because it fails to 
meet the statutory and regulatory requirements. 
Section 3006(b) provides that states submitting programs for 
EPA approval are authorized to administer their program in lieu 
of RCRA unless EPA finds their programs are not equivalent to 
RCRA, not consistent with RCRA, or do not adequately enforce 
RCRA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006).  A state program that does 
not regulate an entire segment of hazardous waste facilities 
regulated by RCRA is not equivalent to RCRA.  Section 3006(e) 
authorizes EPA to withdraw authorization of a state program 
that no longer meets the requirements for approval under § 
3006(b).  See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006).  EPA set forth 
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circumstances indicating noncompliance, which includes the 
inability of a State‘s legal authority to meet requirements, and 
action by a state legislature that strikes down or limits state 
authorities.  40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(1)(ii) (2010).  By removing 
criminal sanctions, the ERAA amendment to the RAA effectively 
reduced New Union‘s enforcement authorities.  Specifically, New 
Union‘s program lacks the requisite enforcement mechanisms set 
forth in § 271.16, which requires an approved state program to 
have available criminal remedies.  See 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(3) 
(2010). 
Second, by transferring all standard setting, permitting, 
inspection, and enforcement authorities related to rail 
transporters and hazardous waste treatment, storage, and 
disposal facilities associated with railroads (railroad TSDs) from 
the DEP to the Commission, the ERAA effectively removed rail 
transporters and railroad TSDs from being regulated under the 
state‘s hazardous waste program, thereby rendering New Union‘s 
program a partial program.  See 40 C.F.R. § 271.11 (2010) 
(requiring state programs to cover all transporters listed under § 
263 of the regulations, including intrastate rail); 40 C.F.R. § 
271.12 (2010) (requiring state programs to cover all hazardous 
waste management facilities listed under §§ 264, 265, and 266); 
40 C.F.R. § 271.1(h) (2010) (―[p]artial State programs are not 
allowed for programs operating under RCRA final 
authorization.‖).  Applying EPA‘s regulations, CARE will argue 
that the ERAA amendment renders New Union‘s program an 
impermissible partial program.  The railroad Commission has not 
promulgated regulations for these transporters and TSDs, and 
they are no longer subject to the DEP‘s regulations, leaving them 
wholly unregulated. 
RCRA requires a state program be no less stringent than the 
federal requirements.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).  By 
deregulating railroad hazardous waste facilities and removing 
criminal sanctions, CARE will argue that the ERAA amendment 
accomplishes exactly the opposite.  CARE will argue that as New 
Union‘s program is clearly inconsistent with RCRA‘s statutory 
scheme, EPA must withdraw approval of the program. 
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EPA and New Union’s argument 
EPA and New Union will argue that New Union‘s program is 
still in compliance and that even if EPA were to determine that 
New Union‘s program is in violation, the Administrator is not 
required to withdraw approval. 
a. The ERAA amendment does not constitute an action 
by a state legislature that strikes down or limits 
state authorities. 
EPA‘s regulation provides that withdrawal of authorization 
of a state‘s program may be warranted by an ―[a]ction by state 
legislature or court striking down or limiting State authorities.‖  
40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(1)(ii) (2010).  EPA and New Union will 
argue that this provision does not apply to the case at bar because 
the ERAA amendments to the RAA do not limit New Union‘s 
authority in regulating hazardous waste. 
The ERAA transfers authority to regulate railroad facilities 
from the DEP to the Commission.  EPA and New Union will 
argue that a transfer of authority does not equal a limitation of 
such authority.  Instead of the DEP, the Commission now has ―all 
standard setting, permitting, inspection and enforcement 
authorities‖ with regards to railroad facilities.  The Commission 
has administered this authority over the past ten years, and 
nothing in the record indicates a failure of the Commission to 
carry out these responsibilities. 
Second, EPA and New Union will argue that even though the 
ERAA amendment removed criminal sanctions for violations of 
environmental statutes by railroad facilities, this does not render 
ineffective New Union‘s authority to take enforcement actions.  
New Union still has the authority to restrain or enjoin any person 
from engaging in any unauthorized activities and can also impose 
civil sanctions.  Additionally, EPA can easily supplement New 
Union‘s enforcement authority by undertaking actions seeking 
criminal penalties for violators in New Union.  See United States 
v. Elias, 269 F.3d at 1010 (upholding EPA‘s interpretation that 
RCRA does not cede exclusive enforcement authority to states); 
Wyckoff Co. v. EPA, 796 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.1986).  As such, the 
removal of criminal sanctions does not hamper or limit New 
Union‘s authorities. 
50https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
03 JUDGES_MEMO 4/24/2011  2:25 AM 
70   PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1 
Furthermore, EPA and New Union will argue that even if 
New Union‘s program is found to be in violation of the 
requirements set forth in § 3006(b) of RCRA, withdrawal of the 
entire program is a drastic and extreme measure for a relatively 
minor defect in the state‘s program.  See supra Issue V.  
Alternatively, EPA can undertake various steps to supplement 
New Union‘s enforcement authority.  See supra Issue V.  
Additionally, EPA can require New Union to follow the 
procedures for revision of its state program as set forth in 40 
C.F.R. § 271.21.  See 40 C.F.R. § 271.21 (2010). 
b. A state with an approved program may delegate 
responsibilities to carry forth the state’s hazardous 
waste regulatory scheme among its state agencies. 
EPA and New Union will argue that EPA‘s regulation 
indicates that a state with an approved RCRA program has the 
power to ―transfer all or part of any program from the approved 
State agency to any other State agency.‖  40 C.F.R. § 271.21(c) 
(2010).  EPA and New Union will argue that the ERAA 
amendment did exactly this—it transferred the part of its state 
regulatory program dealing with railroad facilities from the DEP 
to the railroad Commission.  EPA and New Union will also point 
out that in practice, regulatory responsibilities are often divided 
amongst agencies according to their particular expertise.  For 
example, § 2002(a)(6) of RCRA authorizes the Administrator ―to 
delegate to the Secretary of Transportation the performance of 
any inspection or enforcement function. . .relating to the 
transportation of hazardous waste where such delegation would 
avoid unnecessary duplication of activity.  42 U.S.C. § 6912(a)(6) 
(2006); see also Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626 (9th 
Cir. 2004).  EPA and New Union will argue that similarly, the 
ERAA delegated to the railroad Commission the authority to 
regulate railroad facilities in order to avoid duplication of 
activity.  Further, from a practical standpoint, the railroad 
Commission is well-informed of the dangers associated with the 
transport of hazardous waste via the railroads.  EPA and New 
Union will argue that, as such, the Commission is in a position to 
better assess a given situation pertaining to transport via the 
railroads and take appropriate actions. 
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ISSUE VII 
Must EPA withdraw its approval of New Union’s 
program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders New Union’s program 
not equivalent to the federal RCRA program, inconsistent 
with the federal program and other approved state 
programs, or in violation of the Commerce Clause? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that the Act‘s treatment of pollutant X makes 
New Union‘s program not equivalent to the federal program, 
inconsistent with the federal program and other approved state 
programs, and in violation of the Commerce Clause. 
EPA and New Union argue that the Act‘s treatment of 
pollutant X does not adversely affect the equivalency of the state 
program with the federal program, is not inconsistent with the 
federal or other approved state programs, and does not violate the 
Commerce Clause. 
Discussion 
A. Must EPA withdraw approval because the Act’s 
treatment of Pollutant X renders the state RCRA 
program not equivalent to the Federal program? 
CARE’s argument 
CARE will argue that ERAA‘s treatment of Pollutant X 
renders New Union‘s program not equivalent to the Federal 
program because its treatment of Pollutant X is different from 
that of EPA and other states with approved programs.  Standards 
for the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste, such 
as Pollutant X, are set forth in RCRA §§ 3001-3018.  See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (2006).  The Federal program treats 
Pollutant X the same way it treats other hazardous waste—in 
accordance with the standards set forth in §§ 3001-3018.  A state 
that has been authorized to carry out its own program in lieu of 
the federal program becomes the sole permitting authority for the 
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treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste within its 
borders.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (2006).  Pollutant X is a listed 
hazardous waste for which the federal RCRA program requires 
permits.  Yet, New Union‘s state program prohibits the issuance 
of permits for the treatment, storage, and disposal of Pollutant X.  
Thus, New Union‘s program no longer complies with the 
standards set forth in RCRA §§ 3001-3018.  CARE will argue 
that, as such, New Union‘s program conflicts with the federal 
program, and is therefore not equivalent to the federal program 
or the programs of other states. 
EPA and New Union’s Argument 
EPA and New Union will argue that New Union‘s program is 
equivalent to RCRA‘s federal statutory scheme because the ERAA 
provision regarding Pollutant X makes New Union‘s program 
more stringent than the federal program.  RCRA expressly allows 
states to adopt more stringent requirements, and provides that 
―no State. . .may impose any requirements less stringent than 
those authorized under this subchapter respecting the same 
matter as governed by such regulations. . .. Nothing in this 
chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State. . .thereof from 
imposing any requirements, including those for site selection, 
which are more stringent than those imposed by such 
regulations.‖  42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).  The EPA also interprets 
more stringent requirements to be equivalent to RCRA.  See 40 
C.F.R. § 271.1(i)(1) (2010).  RCRA sets a floor, not a ceiling and, 
as such, states can adopt regulations that are more stringent but 
not less stringent.  See Safety-Kleen, Inc. v Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 
863 (4th Cir. 2001).  Courts have consistently held that where a 
state‘s hazardous waste program is more stringent than RCRA, it 
is ―equivalent‖ to RCRA.  See Old Bridge Chemicals, Inc. v. New 
Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Washington Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1467 (9th 
Cir. 1985).  As such, New Union‘s program is still equivalent to 
the federal program. 
EPA and New Union will argue that when EPA initially 
approved New Union‘s program in 1986, EPA deemed the 
program equivalent to the Federal program.  EPA and New 
Union will argue that since the initial approval, the 2000 ERAA 
amendment imposed a more stringent requirement for the 
53
03 JUDGES_MEMO 4/24/2011  2:25 AM 
2011] NELMCC JUDGES’ EDITION MEMORANDUM 73 
treatment, transport, and disposal of Pollutant X.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 
2000, pp. 105-07).  Citing to § 3009 of RCRA, EPA‘s regulation § 
271.1(i)(1), and the court decisions above, EPA and New Union 
will argue that ERAA‘s treatment of Pollutant X does not 
adversely affect the equivalency of New Union‘s program with the 
federal program. 
B. Must EPA withdraw approval because the state 
Act renders the state RCRA program inconsistent 
with the Federal program and other approved 
state programs? 
Under § 3006 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926, EPA may authorize 
a State to implement its own hazardous waste program ―in lieu 
of‖ the federal program, as long as the state program is, among 
other things, not inconsistent with the federal program or other 
state programs.  42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2006).  EPA regulations 
interpreting the ―consistency‖ requirement state that a state 
program shall be deemed inconsistent in the following 
circumstances: (a) if any aspect of the State program. . 
.unreasonably restricts, impedes, or operates as a ban on the free 
movement across the State border of hazardous wastes from or to 
other States for treatment, storage, or disposal at facilities 
authorized to operate under the Federal or an approved State 
program; (b) if any aspect of State law or of the State program. . . 
has no basis in human health or environmental protection and. . 
.acts as a prohibition on the treatment, storage or disposal of 
hazardous waste in the State; or (c) if the State manifest system 
does not meet the requirements of this part.  40 C.F.R. § 271.4 
(2010). 
CARE’s argument 
CARE will argue that the amendments to the Act render the 
state program inconsistent in all three circumstances listed in the 
regulations.  First CARE will argue that the amendment 
unreasonably restricts or impedes the free movement of Pollutant 
X across the State border by requiring that transportation of 
Pollutant X through New Union be ―as direct and fast as 
reasonably possible, with no stops within the state except for 
emergencies and necessary refueling.‖  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 
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105-07).  CARE will argue this unreasonably impedes the free 
movement of Pollutant X across the State border because 
transporters may need to stop for reasons other than an 
emergency, including meals, breaks, or lodging.  As such, many 
transporters may be reluctant to travel through New Union. 
Second, CARE will argue that the amendment ―acts as a 
prohibition on the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous 
wastes in the state,‖ since the amendment prohibits the DEP 
from issuing permits for the ―treatment, storage or disposal‖ of 
Pollutant X.  State law ―acts as a prohibition‖ on treatment of 
hazardous wastes, for purposes of determining whether it is 
inconsistent with RCRA, when state law effects a total ban on 
particular waste treatment technology within state.  See 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 
1395 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County 
Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that ―the 
savings clause of § 6929 speaks only in terms of saving to state 
and local authorities the power to impose more stringent 
―requirements‖ and it does not vest in such authorities the power 
to ban outright important activities that RCRA is designed to 
promote. . .‖).  CARE will argue that since the ERAA amendment 
prohibits issuance of permits for the treatment, storage, or 
disposal of Pollutant X, the amendment amounts to a ban on 
Pollutant X waste treatment technology. 
Third, CARE will argue that although the ERAA amendment 
may have a basis in protecting the health of the citizens of New 
Union, it cannot do so at the expense of the citizens of states that 
do not ban the treatment, storage, and disposal of Pollutant X. 
Furthermore, CARE will argue that the state program 
manifestly does not meet the requirements for final state 
programs because, by not allowing for the DEP to issue permits 
for all substances defined as ―hazardous waste‖ –namely, 
Pollutant X –it does not meet the requirements set forth in 
RCRA. 
EPA and New Union’s argument 
EPA and New Union will counter by arguing that the 
restrictions on transportation of Pollutant X through the state are 
not unreasonable.  The amendment still allows for the movement 
of Pollutant X through the state, and it is likely that a 
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transportation company would choose a direct route and limit 
stops to those only absolutely necessary for maximum efficiency, 
even without the amendment.  The amendment in no way 
prevents transportation of Pollutant X through the state by 
imposing these restrictions.  See Blue Circle Cement, 27 F.3d at 
1508. 
Second, EPA and New Union may argue that while the 
amendment may prohibit the treatment, storage, or disposal of 
Pollutant X in the state, this prohibition is based on human 
health and environmental protection.  Since there is no way to 
treat or dispose of Pollutant X, one of the most potent and toxic 
chemicals to public health and the environment, within the state, 
measures to not allow it in New Union serve as the best way to 
protect public health and the environment.  See Blue Circle 
Cement, 27 F.3d at 1508 (holding that ―an ordinance that falls 
short of imposing a total ban on encouraged activity will 
ordinarily be upheld so long as it is supported by a record 
establishing that it is a reasonable response to a legitimate local 
concern for safety or welfare‖); see also Old Bridge Chemicals, 
Inc. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 965 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 
(3d Cir. 1992); LaFarge Corp. v. Campbell, 813 F. Supp. 501, 508-
12 (W.D. Tex. 1993); N. Haven Planning & Zoning Comm’n v. 
Upjohn Co., 753 F. Supp. 423, 431 (D. Conn. 1990).  Since the 
EPA allows for a ban on treatment, storage, or disposal of 
hazardous waste when done for the purpose of protecting human 
health or the environment, New Union is proper in its ban on 
issuing permits for Pollutant X. 
For the reasons above, New Union and EPA will argue that 
the state program meets the requirements of consistency set forth 
in 40 C.F.R. 271.4. 
C. Must EPA withdraw approval because the state 
Act is in violation of the commerce clause? 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives the 
Federal government the power to ―regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes.‖  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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CARE’s argument 
a. ERAA’s ban on issuing permits to facilities for the 
treatment, storage, or disposal of Pollutant X places 
an excessive burden on interstate commerce and 
therefore violates the Commerce Clause. 
The Commerce Clause limits the power of States to 
discriminate against interstate commerce. New Energy Co. v. 
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (―actions are within the domain 
of the Commerce Clause if they burden interstate commerce or 
impede its free flow‖).  Where a state statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest and only 
incidentally burdens interstate commerce then it will be upheld, 
unless the burden is clearly excessive in relation to the local 
benefits derived from such state law.  Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 617 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 
U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  ―[W]hat is ultimate is the principle that one 
state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a 
position of economic isolation.‖  Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 
527 (1935). 
During the final rule making process, EPA found that ―[a] 
State that refuses entirely to allow a necessary part of national 
commerce—the disposal of hazardous wastes—to take place 
within its boundaries is impeding the flow of interstate commerce 
just as much as a State that refuses to allow the transportation of 
those wastes.‖  Consistency, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,395 (May 19, 
1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 123.32).  CARE will argue that 
the ERAA amendment prohibits the DEP from issuing permits 
allowing the disposal of Pollutant X which, in effect, prevents the 
disposal of Pollutant X within New Union.  Thereby, according to 
EPA‘s statement during the final rule making process, the ERAA 
amendment clearly violates the Commerce Clause.  Second, ―just 
as a State‘s ban on interstate transport of hazardous waste could 
violate the commerce clause under City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey. . .so could a ban on the treatment of waste‖.  Hazardous 
Waste Treatment Council v. Reilly, 938 F.2d 1390, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 
1991).  Once again, CARE will argue that since the ERAA 
amendment prohibits the DEP from issuing permits allowing 
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treatment of Pollutant X, the amendment in effect imposes an 
outright ban on the treatment of Pollutant X.  As such, the 
amendment violates the Commerce Clause. 
Even though New Union may argue that it enacted the 
amendment to protect its citizens from the potential risk that 
Pollutant X places on public health and the environment, CARE 
will argue that the local public interest does not hold weight.  The 
problem of hazardous waste is a matter of national concern and 
focus.  By outright prohibiting the treatment, storage, and 
disposal of Pollutant X within the state, New Union has placed 
itself in a position of economic isolation.  Additionally, although 
New Union does not prevent out-of-state Pollutant X from being 
transported through New Union, the restrictions it imposes have 
effects identical to those prohibited in Baldwin.  New Union has 
effectively removed itself from bearing any responsibility for the 
Pollutant X that it is creating; instead, shifting the burden on 
other states that do issue such permits.  CARE will argue that in 
light of the fact that Pollutant X is one of the most potent and 
toxic chemicals in the world, the burden New Union places on 
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in comparison to the 
local benefits to its citizens. 
Additionally, with respect to ERAA‘s restrictions on the 
transport of Pollutant X within New Union, CARE will argue that 
there are nondiscriminatory alternatives to preserve New Union‘s 
interests in protecting its citizens and the environment from 
exposure to Pollutant X.  Since New Union failed to undertake 
any nondiscriminatory alternatives, the ERAA violates the 
Commerce Clause.  See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 
U.S. 334, 342 (1992), (holding that a successful dormant 
commerce clause claim must show that the discriminatory action 
is justified by some factor that is not related to economic 
protectionism, and that there are no ―nondiscriminatory 
alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.‖); 
see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 
389 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 
U.S. 93, 100 (1994). 
EPA and New Union’s argument 
a. New Union’s program does not violate the Commerce 
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Clause because the ERAA amendment only 
incidentally burdens interstate commerce. 
A restriction on commerce that benefits in-state economic 
interests and burdens out-of-state economic interests is per se 
invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.  Oregon Waste Sys., 511 
U.S. at 100-01.  But where a state law regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest and only incidentally 
burdens interstate commerce, it will be upheld, unless the burden 
is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits derived from 
such state law.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.  EPA and New Union will 
argue that the ERAA does not discriminate against out-of-state 
generators and transporters of Pollutant X, and therefore does 
not facially discriminate against interstate commerce.  As such, 
the ERAA amendment should be evaluated according to the Pike 
test.  Under the Pike test, ERAA can only be found to violate the 
Commerce Clause if the burden it places on interstate commerce 
is clearly excessive.  EPA and New Union will argue that ERAA 
only incidentally burdens interstate commerce in that it poses 
some restrictions on the transport of Pollutant X through New 
Union and prevents potential TSDs from operating in New Union.  
In contrast, the amendment clearly serves a strong, legitimate 
public interest.  The legislative history to the amendment clearly 
indicates that it was adopted after recognition that Pollutant X is 
among the most potent and toxic chemicals to public health and 
the environment.  (Rec. doc. 5 for 2000, pp. 105-07).  Since New 
Union is not able to treat or dispose of Pollutant X because there 
are no facilities within the state capable of handling it safely, the 
amendment was adopted to minimize the possibility of inevitable 
accidents, clearly intended to protect the citizens of New Union.  
EPA and New Union will argue that this burden is not excessive 
in comparison to the benefits derived by the amendment and 
therefore the ERAA amendment does not violate the Commerce 
Clause.  As such, New Union‘s adoption of the ERAA amendment 
was a legitimate exercise of the broad regulatory authority 
retained by states to protect the health and safety of its citizens.  
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (holding that a 
state retains broad regulatory authority to protect health and 
safety of its citizens ―as long as a state does not needlessly 
obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place itself in a position of 
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economic isolation. . .‖); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 
U.S. 761, 767 (1945). 
Second, EPA and New Union will argue that the Act does not 
violate the Commerce Clause because there is no 
nondiscriminatory alternative that will adequately protect the 
public and environmental health from exposure to pollutant X.  
See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 540 U.S. at 342 (holding 
that a successful dormant commerce clause claim must show that 
there are no ―nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to 
preserve the local interests at stake‖).  They will reiterate that 
the state is not able to treat or dispose of Pollutant X because 
there are no such facilities within the state, and that any 
exposure to Pollutant X is highly destructive to both human 
health and the environment.  EPA and New Union will argue 
that limiting unnecessary transportation of Pollutant X within 
the state is a necessary and justifiable measure to protect the 
public and the environment, and does not serve any economic 
interest whatsoever. 
b. Even if the ERAA amendment is found to violate the 
Commerce Clause, it does not require a withdrawal 
of New Union’s hazardous waste program. 
Finally, EPA and New Union will argue that, even if the 
state Act is declared unconstitutional, there is no affirmative 
duty on the part of the EPA to withdraw approval of the 
remainder of New Union‘s RCRA program for the reasons 
outlined supra Issue V. 
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QUESTIONS FOR ORALISTS 
ISSUE I 
Whether RCRA’s citizen suit provision (§ 7002(a)(2)) 
provides jurisdiction for district courts to order EPA to 
act on CARE’s petition for revocation of EPA’s approval of 
New Union’s hazardous waste program, filed pursuant to 
RCRA § 7004? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE and EPA argue that RCRA § 7002(a)(2) provides 
jurisdiction to order EPA to respond to CARE‘s petition.  CARE 
argues § 7004 also provides jurisdiction to order EPA to 
commence proceedings to consider withdrawing approval of New 
Union‘s program under § 3006(b), while EPA argues it does not. 
New Union argues that RCRA § 7002(a)(2) does not provide 
jurisdiction to order EPA to act on a petition filed pursuant to 
RCRA § 7004. 
Questions 
For CARE and EPA 
1. In distinguishing rulemaking from adjudication, courts 
have generally held that adjudications involve specific 
parties and have an immediate effect on those involved in 
the dispute, whereas rulemaking is prospective and has a 
definitive effect only after the rule is subsequently applied. 
What facts can you point to in the Record to support a 
position that EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s program was 
a rulemaking and not an order? 
2. If this Court finds that the issue in this case concerns the 
withdrawal of New Union‘s program under § 3006(e) of 
RCRA, then was CARE‘s petition, which was filed under § 
7004(a), still proper? 
3. A) Doesn‘t the issue here concern the withdrawal of 
authorization of New Union‘s state program under § 
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3006(e) of RCRA and not EPA‘s initial approval of New 
Union‘s program under § 3006(b)? 
B) The language in § 3006(e) seems to require the EPA 
Administrator to apply specific facts pertaining to New 
Union‘s program in determining whether to withdraw 
authorization, and as such isn‘t this adjudicative in nature 
(therefore not a rulemaking)? 
4. Based on the facts of this case, if this Court finds that 
EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s program was an order, 
would the District Court have jurisdiction? 
5. Is EPA‘s determination that its approval of New Union‘s 
program was a rulemaking entitled to Chevron deference? 
6. All parties agree that EPA had a nondiscretionary duty to 
respond to CARE‘s petition.  What factors should this 
Court rely on to determine whether or not EPA had a 
nondiscretionary duty to commence withdrawal 
proceedings? 
7. For EPA: Petitions are a crucial mechanism through 
which citizens can bring alleged defects in the 
implementation of RCRA to the attention of the agency.  If 
this Court were to determine that EPA does not have a 
mandatory duty to act on such petitions, what safeguards 
exist to ensure that RCRA‘s enforcement scheme is not 
hampered? 
8. For CARE: Isn‘t EPA‘s decision not to commence 
withdrawal proceedings an exercise of its prosecutorial 
discretion, and therefore immune from judicial review? 
For New Union 
1. In distinguishing rulemaking from adjudication, courts 
have generally held that adjudications involve specific 
parties and have an immediate effect on those involved in 
the dispute, whereas rulemaking is prospective and has a 
definitive effect only after the rule is subsequently applied. 
What facts can you point to in the Record to support a 
position that EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s program was 
an order and not a rulemaking? 
2. Since RCRA does not specify whether EPA should proceed 
under rulemaking or adjudication in approving a state 
62https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol1/iss1/3
03 JUDGES_MEMO 4/24/2011  2:25 AM 
82   PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 1 
program, isn‘t EPA‘s determination that its approval of 
New Union‘s program was a rulemaking entitled to 
Chevron deference? 
3. If this court finds that the issue in this case concerns the 
revocation of EPA‘s initial authorization of the state 
program under 3006(b) of RCRA, then wasn‘t CARE‘s 
petition properly brought pursuant to § 7004(a)? 
ISSUE II 
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provide jurisdiction for district 
courts to order EPA to act on CARE’s petition for 
revocation of EPA’s approval of New Union’s hazardous 
waste program, filed under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides district court 
jurisdiction to order EPA to act on a petition filed pursuant to § 
553(e) of the APA. 
EPA and New Union argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not 
provide district court jurisdiction to order EPA to act on a petition 
filed pursuant to § 553(e) of the APA. 
Questions 
For CARE 
1. Since § 7004 of RCRA is the specific authority for 
rulemaking petitions under RCRA, doesn‘t it displace § 
553(e) of APA under the maxim of statutory construction 
that the specific governs over the general? 
2. Section 553(e) allows an interested person the right to 
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 
a. What facts can you point to in support of the 
position that EPA‘s approval of New Union‘s 
program was a rulemaking and not an order? 
b. What facts can you point to in support of the 
position that EPA‘s withdrawal of approval of a 
state program is a rulemaking and not an order? 
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3. What facts or factors should this Court consider in order to 
determine if RCRA‘s citizen suit provision does not 
preclude review under the APA? 
For EPA and New Union 
1. ―The specific governs over the general.‖  Why would this 
maxim of statutory construction preclude judicial review 
under the APA? 
2. Given that RCRA‘s citizen suit provision does not preclude 
review of agency action under the APA, doesn‘t the 
District Court have federal question jurisdiction to order 
EPA to act on CARE‘s petition? 
3. For New Union: Briefly explain why this Court should 
find that CARE‘s petition under § 553(e) of the APA is 
improper. 
ISSUE III 
Whether EPA’s failure to act on CARE’s petition 
constituted a constructive denial of that petition and a 
constructive determination that New Union’s program 
continued to meet criteria for program approval under 
RCRA § 3006(b), both subject to judicial review under 
RCRA 7006(b) 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that EPA‘s failure to act on the petition 
constituted constructive denial of the petition and a constructive 
determination that New Union‘s program continues to meet the 
criteria for approval, and that both actions are subject to judicial 
review. 
EPA and New Union argue that inaction on CARE‘s petition 
is not a constructive action of any kind and is therefore not 
subject to judicial review. 
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Questions 
For CARE 
1. Explain what the doctrine of constructive submission is, 
what its underlying purpose is, and why the underlying 
principle of the constructive submission doctrine should be 
applied in this case? 
2. Scott v. Hammond concerned § 303(d) of the Clean Water 
Act, which sets forth explicit statutory time limits.  
However, § 7004(a) sets no specific time limits within 
which EPA must act. 
a. What facts or factors should this Court consider in 
determining whether EPA‘s failure to respond to 
the petition constituted a constructive denial of the 
petition? 
b. What facts or factors should this Court consider in 
determining whether EPA‘s inaction on the petition 
constituted a constructive determination that New 
Union‘s program continues to meet RCRA‘s criteria 
for program approval? 
3. Assuming that this Court finds that EPA‘s only 
nondiscretionary duty was to respond to CARE‘s petition 
and nothing more, would EPA‘s failure to respond still 
constitute a constructive determination that New Union‘s 
program continues to meet RCRA‘s criteria for program 
approval? 
4. Section 7006(b) grants jurisdiction for review of the 
Administrator‘s action only in granting, denying, or 
withdrawing authorization or interim authorization of a 
state program. 
In the event this Court finds that EPA‘s inaction on the 
petition constituted a constructive denial of the petition, 
wouldn‘t this Court still lack jurisdiction under § 7006(b) 
to review EPA‘s constructive denial? 
5. In Heckler v. Chaney the Supreme Court held that an 
agency‘s decision not to take an enforcement action is 
presumed immune from judicial review. 
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a. Isn‘t EPA‘s decision not to commence withdrawal 
proceedings an exercise of its discretion not to 
undertake enforcement actions? 
b. If not, how is the present case distinguishable from 
Chaney? 
For EPA and New Union 
1. How is this case distinguishable from Scott v Hammond? 
2. Section 7004(a) sets forth a ―within a reasonable time‖ 
standard within which EPA is to respond to petitions.  
Explain why this Court should find that EPA‘s failure to 
respond to the petition for an entire year does not 
constitute an unreasonable delay thereby amounting to a 
constructive denial of the petition? 
3. Many of the purported inadequacies and failures of New 
Union‘s program date as far back as 2000 but EPA has not 
taken any action.  Doesn‘t EPA‘s continuous failure to 
commence withdrawal proceedings thereby constitute a 
constructive determination by it that New Union‘s 
program continues to meet RCRA‘s criteria for program 
approval?  Are there any facts or factors that support a 
finding to the contrary? 
ISSUE IV 
Assuming the answer to issue III is positive and the 
answer to either or both of issues I and II is positive, 
should this Court: (1) lift the stay in C.A. No. 18-2010 and 
proceed with judicial review of EPA’s constructive 
actions; or (2) remand the case to the district court to 
order EPA to conduct proceedings to consider withdrawal 
of approval of New Union’s hazardous waste program? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that the Court should lift the stay and proceed 
with judicial review rather than remanding to the lower court. 
EPA and New Union argue that the Court should not lift the 
stay, but instead remand the case to the court below to order EPA 
to initiate proceedings under RCRA §§ 3006(e) and 7004. 
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Questions 
For CARE 
1. Section 7006(b) grants jurisdiction for review of the 
Administrator‘s action only in granting, denying, or 
withdrawing authorization or interim authorization of a 
state program.  Your suit challenges EPA‘s failure to 
withdraw authorization of New Union‘s program.  As such, 
doesn‘t judicial review of your challenged action fall 
outside the jurisdiction conferred by § 7006(b)? 
2. Assuming that § 7006(b) grants jurisdiction to hear your 
challenge, the section nonetheless requires that 
application for judicial review be made within ninety days 
from the date of issuance, denial, modification, revocation, 
grant, or withdrawal, unless the application is based solely 
on grounds arising after such ninetieth day. 
EPA and New Union argue that many of the facts alleged 
by you date back to 2000 and that, as such, your 
application for review is time-barred.  Can you articulate 
an argument why this Court should find otherwise? 
3. The Supreme Court has held that the focal point for 
judicial review should be the administrative record that 
already exists.  Since EPA has not developed an 
administrative record, how can this Court engage in a 
meaningful review of EPA‘s alleged constructive actions? 
For EPA and New Union 
1. Given that all facts alleged by CARE are uncontested and 
all parties agree that no further facts are necessary to 
decide the matter, the only issues that remain are legal in 
nature.  As such, don‘t considerations to judicial economy 
require this Court to lift the stay and proceed with judicial 
review? 
2. Assuming this Court finds that EPA‘s failure to act on 
CARE‘s petition to initiate proceedings to withdraw 
authorization constitutes a constructive determination by 
EPA that New Union‘s program continues to meet RCRA‘s 
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criteria for program approval, wouldn‘t this Court have 
jurisdiction for judicial review under § 7006(b)? 
3. Even though the statutory language of § 7006(b) does not 
specifically grant jurisdiction for judicial review of EPA‘s 
determination not to withdraw authorization, isn‘t this 
determination functionally similar to EPA‘s action in 
granting authorization, thereby conferring jurisdiction to 
this Court to review EPA‘s constructive actions? 
4. Articulate the facts in the record that would support your 
position that CARE‘s petition is time-barred. 
ISSUE V 
Must EPA withdraw its approval of New Union’s 
program because its resources and performance fail to 
meet RCRA’s approval criteria? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that New Union‘s resources and performance 
are not sufficient and that EPA must therefore withdraw its 
approval of New Union‘s program. 
EPA and New Union argue that New Union‘s resources and 
performance are sufficient and that even if they were insufficient, 
EPA has discretion to take action other than withdrawing 
approval. 
Questions 
For CARE 
1. What facts can you point to in the Record to support a 
finding that New Union‘s resources and performance are 
not sufficient to provide adequate enforcement of 
compliance with RCRA? 
2. If this Court were to find that New Union‘s resources and 
performance no longer provide adequate enforcement of 
compliance with RCRA, would EPA be required to 
withdraw approval of New Union‘s program? 
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3. EPA and New Union argue that § 3006 does not 
unambiguously mandate that EPA commence withdrawal 
proceedings, and that since there is ambiguity with 
respect to the specific question, EPA‘s interpretation of § 
3006(b) is entitled to Chevron deference.  Can you point to 
precedent that supports a contrary finding? 
For EPA and New Union 
1. What facts can you point to in the Record to support a 
finding that New Union‘s resources and performance are 
sufficient to provide adequate enforcement of compliance 
with RCRA? 
2. The language in § 3006(e) of RCRA states that when the 
Administrator determines that a state is no longer 
administering and enforcing its program in accordance 
with the requirements set forth in § 3006(b), the 
Administrator shall notify the state and if the state fails to 
take corrective action within a reasonable time, not to 
exceed ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw 
authorization of such program. 
Doesn‘t the above language set forth a mandatory duty on 
the Administrator to withdraw authorization? 
3. If this Court were to find that New Union‘s resources and 
performance no longer provide adequate enforcement of 
compliance with RCRA, briefly explain policy 
considerations and alternatives this Court should consider 
to support a finding that EPA is not required to withdraw 
approval of New Union‘s program 
ISSUE VI 
Must EPA withdraw its approval of New Union’s 
program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act effectively withdraws railroad 
hazardous waste facilities from regulation? 
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Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that since New Union does not regulate all 
facilities regulated by RCRA, EPA must withdraw its approval of 
New Union‘s program. 
EPA and New Union argue that New Union‘s present failure 
to regulate railroad hazardous waste facilities does not require 
EPA to withdraw its approval of the entire program. 
Questions 
For CARE 
1. New Union‘s Environmental Regulatory Adjustment Act 
(Act) transfers authority to regulate railroad facilities 
from the DEP to the New Union Railroad Commission.  A 
transfer of authority from one state agency to another is 
not a limitation on the authority.  Are there any other 
grounds to find that the Act limits the state‘s authority? 
2. EPA‘s regulation indicates that a state with an approved 
RCRA program has the power to transfer all or part of any 
program from the approved State agency to any other 
state agency.  Thus, isn‘t New Union transfer of authority 
to regulate railroad facilities from the DEP to the 
Commission a proper and permissible action? 
3. Briefly provide reasons why a finding that the Act 
effectively withdraws railroad hazardous waste facilities 
from regulation would require a withdrawal of New 
Union‘s entire state program, despite the fact that a total 
withdrawal is a drastic and extreme measure. 
For EPA and New Union 
1. Doesn‘t the Act deregulate New Union‘s railroad 
hazardous waste facilities, thereby rendering New Union‘s 
program an impermissible partial state program? 
2. The Act removes criminal sanctions for violations of 
environmental statutes by railroad hazardous waste 
facilities.  Doesn‘t this in effect reduce New Union‘s 
enforcement authorities, thereby rendering New Union‘s 
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program no longer in compliance with the requirements 
set forth in RCRA? 
3. RCRA requires a state program be no less stringent than 
the federal requirements.  Doesn‘t the Act render New 
Union‘s program less stringent, thereby rendering the 
program inconsistent with RCRA‘s statutory scheme? 
ISSUE VII 
Must EPA withdraw its approval of New Union’s 
program because the New Union 2000 Environmental 
Regulatory Adjustment Act renders New Union’s program 
not equivalent to the federal RCRA program, inconsistent 
with the federal program and other approved state 
programs, or in violation of the Commerce Clause? 
Position of the Parties 
CARE argues that the Act‘s treatment of pollutant X makes 
New Union‘s program not equivalent to the federal program, 
inconsistent with the federal program and other approved state 
programs, and in violation of the Commerce Clause. 
EPA and New Union argue that the Act‘s treatment of 
pollutant X does not adversely affect the equivalency of the state 
program with the federal program, is not inconsistent with the 
federal or other approved state programs, and does not violate the 
Commerce Clause. 
Questions 
For CARE 
1. Since New Union has no way to treat or dispose of 
Pollutant X within the state, isn‘t the prohibition on the 
treatment, storage, or disposal of Pollutant X in New 
Union based on legitimate human health and 
environmental protection concerns?  Is the local concern 
outweighed by other factors? 
2. What are the circumstances under which a state program 
will be deemed inconsistent with the federal program and 
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other approved state programs?  Which of these 
circumstances are present in this case? 
3. EPA and New Union argue that the state program does 
not violate the Commerce Clause because the Act only 
incidentally burdens interstate commerce.  What factors 
support your position that the burden New Union places 
on interstate commerce is excessive in comparison to the 
local benefits to its citizens? 
4. Were there any nondiscriminatory alternatives available 
to New Union to preserve its interests in protecting its 
citizens and the environment from exposure to Pollutant 
X? 
For EPA and New Union 
1. Pollutant X is a listed hazardous waste for which the 
federal RCRA program requires permits.  Yet, the Act 
prohibits the issuance of permits for the treatment, 
storage, and disposal of Pollutant X.  Doesn‘t this render 
New Union‘s program not equivalent to the federal 
program or the programs of other states? 
2. A) What facts and factors support your position that the 
Act imposes a more stringent requirement for the 
treatment, transport, and disposal of Pollutant X than the 
federal program? 
B) What is the significance of a finding that the Act 
imposes a more stringent requirement than the federal 
program in the current case? 
3. The Act states that the transportation of Pollutant X must 
be ―as direct and fast as reasonably possible, with no stops 
within the state except for emergencies and necessary 
refueling.‖  Doesn‘t this unreasonably restrict or impede 
the free movement of Pollutant X across New Union‘s state 
border, thereby rendering New Union‘s program 
inconsistent with the federal program and other approved 
state programs? 
4. A restriction on commerce that benefits in-state economic 
interests and burdens out-of-state economic interests is 
per se invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. 
a. Is the Act subject to strict scrutiny? 
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b. If not, what test should this Court apply to 
determine whether New Union‘s program violates 
the Commerce Clause? 
5. If this Court were to find that the Act‘s treatment of 
Pollutant X violates the Commerce Clause, wouldn‘t this 
require EPA to withdraw New Union‘s hazardous waste 
program? 
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